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Impartial Justice: Restoring Integrity to
Impeachment Trials
Justin D. Rattey*

Abstract
In recent decades, we have witnessed the diminution of the impeachment
process by various actors—especially political parties. But the Founders
envisioned a vastly different process, one that was insulated from
partisanship. In Alexander Hamilton’s words, impeachment trials were
assigned to the Senate because the Senate is “a tribunal sufficiently dignified
[and]
sufficiently
independent.”
Examples
from
the
most
recent impeachment trials of President Donald J. Trump reflect the Senate’s
loss of dignity and independence, with Senator McConnell pledging to work
with the White House throughout the first impeachment process and senators
from both parties conceding that they made up their minds before the trials
even began.
After identifying the permeation of partisanship into the impeachment
process, this Article draws attention to the senatorial impeachment oath—
the oath taken by senators to “do impartial justice”—as one avenue for
reform. The oath has been overlooked in much of the secondary literature
about impeachment, receiving as little as two sentences in one of the most
prominent books about the subject, Charles Black’s Impeachment: A
Handbook. After canvassing the history of the senators’ oath and comparing
that oath to other prominent oaths in American law, this Article explores two
possible reforms: (1) a perjury-like law criminalizing oath-breaking by
senators and (2) Senate rule changes designed to amplify the force of the
oath. Ultimately, Senate rule changes are both more practical and more
likely to survive constitutional scrutiny, but by considering both paths, this
Article presents the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the two modes
of reform.

* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; Ph.D. in Government, Georgetown University. I
am grateful to William Buzbee, Max Crema, and Yuki Segawa for extensive feedback, to those in
Georgetown Law’s Art of Regulatory War seminar for insightful comments and suggestions, and to
the members of the Pepperdine Law Review for their substantive and editorial contributions to this
Article.

123

[Vol. 49: 123, 2022]

Impartial Justice:
Restoring Integrity to Impeachment Trials
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 125
II. IMPEACHMENT ........................................................................................ 133
A. Ideals of Impeachment ................................................................ 135
B. The Diminution of Impeachment Ideals...................................... 139
1. Early American Impeachments ........................................... 139
2. Modern American Impeachments ....................................... 142
C. The Senatorial Impeachment Oath ............................................. 151
III. OATHS ................................................................................................... 154
A. Oaths in American Law .............................................................. 154
B. Juror Oaths: Impartiality ........................................................... 158
C. Oaths for Public Office: Unenforceability ................................. 161
D. Witness Oaths: A Model of Enforceability ................................. 165
IV. REFORMING THE SENATORIAL IMPEACHMENT OATH ........................... 167
A. Defining Impartiality .................................................................. 170
B. Changing the Law....................................................................... 174
C. Changing Senate Rules ............................................................... 183
V. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 193

124

[Vol. 49: 123, 2022]

Impartial Justice:
Restoring Integrity to Impeachment Trials
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

I.

INTRODUCTION

With all else that occurred around the world in 2020 and 2021, it would
be easy to overlook the significance of the fact that the United States House
of Representatives twice impeached President Donald Trump.1 Indeed, the
outcomes of the two trials were largely foreordained. Frank Bowman, one of
the country’s leading impeachment scholars, observed that the President’s
“lawyers could don clown suits and sing endless rounds of ‘Happy
Birthday[,]’ and it wouldn’t affect [the] outcome.”2 Notwithstanding the
predictability of President Trump’s acquittal after each trial, the two
impeachments are ripe with constitutional significance. They brought into
focus not only a chief defect in impeachment proceedings—the permeation of
partisanship into the process—but also potential avenues for reform. The
partisan defect and possible reforms are the subjects of this Article.
On December 18, 2019, the House of Representatives charged President
Trump with abuse of power and obstruction of Congress, claiming that both
offenses constituted “high crimes and misdemeanors.”3 The Senate trial
began on January 16, 2020. At least ostensibly, the charges stemmed from
accusations that President Trump withheld military aid to Ukraine in order to
pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to investigate President
Trump’s political rivals.4 It was—and remains—difficult to disentangle the
particular grievances alleged in the House’s articles of impeachment from the
more general complaints against President Trump that began almost
immediately after his election in 2016, including those that led Deputy

1. See Tessa Berenson, Donald Trump Impeached a Second Time in Historic House Vote, TIME
(Jan. 13, 2021, 4:43 PM), https://time.com/5928988/donald-trump-impeached-second-time/.
2. Frank Bowman (@FOBowman3), TWITTER (Feb. 8, 2021, 11:27 AM),
https://twitter.com/FOBowman3/status/1358859958142517248; see also Professor Bowman’s
Impeachment Expertise Sought by National & International Media, U. MO. SCH. L. (Feb. 5, 2021),
https://law.missouri.edu/news/impeachment/.
3. Articles of Impeachment Against Donald John Trump, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019).
4. See Nicholas Fandos & Michael D. Shear, Trump Impeached for Abuse of Power and
Obstruction
of
Congress,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
10,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/us/politics/trump-impeached.html; Nicholas Fandos, Trump’s
Ukraine Call Was ‘Crazy’ and ‘Frightening,’ Official Told Whistle-Blower, N.Y. TIMES (July 29,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/us/politics/trump-ukraine-whistleblower.html.
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Attorney General Rod Rosenstein to appoint a special counsel in May 2017.5
President Trump and other Republicans quickly labeled the Democratcontrolled House’s actions a witch hunt,6 setting the stage for the President’s
ultimate acquittal in the Republican-led Senate.7
Not even a year later, after President Trump lost his bid for reelection, he
and his supporters engaged in a campaign to delegitimize and undermine the
certification of President-elect Joe Biden’s election win.8 That campaign
culminated in a rally on January 6, 2021—the day on which Congress met to
certify the election results—at which President Trump publicly urged his
supporters to “fight like hell” to defend his presidency.9 After his speech,
5. See, e.g., Quinta Jurecic, DAG Rosenstein Appoints Robert Mueller as Special Counsel,
LAWFARE (May 17, 2017, 6:33 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/dag-rosenstein-appoints-robertmueller-special-counsel. For a more detailed discussion of the circumstances surrounding Special
Counsel Robert Mueller’s appointment and the outcome of his investigation, see Abby Johnston &
Leila
Miller,
The
Mueller
Investigation,
Explained,
PBS
(Mar.
25,
2019),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-mueller-investigation-explained-2/.
6. See Quint Forgey, Trump: Impeachment Process Worse than Salem Witch Trials, POLITICO
(Dec. 17, 2019, 10:03 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-impeachment-process-worse-thansalem-witch-trials/. For an example of another Republican lamenting the witch hunt nature of the
articles of impeachment, see Jody Hice, Impeachment Democrats Will Regret Spearheading the
Political Witch Hunt: Rep. Jody Hice, USA TODAY (Dec. 20, 2019, 11:59 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/12/18/impeachment-democrats-regret-political-witchhunt-jody-hice-editorials-debates/2692474001/.
7. See Nicholas Fandos, Trump Acquitted of Two Impeachment Charges in Near Party-Line Vote,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/trump-acquittedimpeachment.html.
8. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Lara Jakes, Fighting Election Results, Trump Employs a New Weapon:
The Government, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/10/us/politics/trumpelection-results.html. For a sample of the facets of the campaign to delegitimize and undermine the
results of the 2020 presidential election, see generally id. (cataloging President Trump’s influence on
the government); Ann Gerhart, Election Results Under Attack: Here Are the Facts, WASH. POST (Mar.
11, 2021, 7:10 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/interactive/2020/election-integrity/
(“[Former President Trump] spent weeks uttering baseless allegations of election fraud that have been
amplified by allies and conservative media outlets.”); Sam Levine, How the Republican Voter Fraud
Lie Paved the Way for Trump To Undermine Biden’s Presidency, GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2021, 6:02
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/18/trump-republican-voter-fraud-lie-bidenpresidency (“Trump . . . accelerated this dangerous moment . . . .”); Lisa Mascaro & Mary Clare
Jalonick, Republicans Condemn ‘Scheme’ To Undo Election for Trump, A.P. NEWS (Jan. 3, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-elections-coronavirus-pandemice8862b01f07347e7b560a8d6c873d476 (“The unusual challenge to the presidential election, on a scale
unseen since the aftermath of the Civil War, clouded the opening of the new Congress and is set to
consume its first days.”).
9. See, e.g., Kimberly Dozier & Vera Bergengruen, Incited by the President, Pro-Trump Rioters
Violently Storm the Capitol, TIME (Jan. 7, 2021, 11:16 AM), https://time.com/5926883/trumpsupporters-storm-capitol/.
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many of those supporters marched to the U.S. Capitol (where certification was
in progress) and, after clashing with Capitol Police, stormed into the
building.10 The ensuing mayhem left five people dead and dozens, if not
hundreds, injured.11 The violence also jeopardized the country’s long
tradition of peaceful transitions of power.12 Seven days later, on January 13,
the House of Representatives again voted to impeach President Trump, this
time for incitement of an insurrection.13
That being the third failed presidential impeachment trial in the span of
just over two decades (the other being that of President Bill Clinton in 1999),
some may wonder whether impeachment is becoming just a routine
performance at which political parties air their grievances to the American
electorate.14 Those who are accustomed to legislative decision-making
mirroring partisan preferences will not be surprised by such performative
realpolitik. Indeed, statements made before President Trump’s first
impeachment trial foreshadowed the partisanship of the process. Prominent
Republican senators promised they would vote to acquit, while at least one
Democratic senator admitted she had already made up her mind to convict.15
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell assured his Republican constituents
that he was in constant communication with the White House—including the
staff of the very President subject to impeachment charges—as the trial

10. Id.
11. See Kenya Evelyn, Capitol Attack: The Five People Who Died, GUARDIAN (June 17, 2021,
8:03 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/08/capitol-attack-police-officer-fivedeaths.
12. See David S. Cloud & Eli Stokols, Trump Is Throwing a Wrench into What Is Usually a
Seamless
Transfer
of
Power,
L.A.
TIMES
(Jan.
20,
2021,
3:00
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-01-20/trump-disrupts-seamless-transfer-of-power.
13. See Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, For High Crimes and
Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 24, 117th Cong. (2021).
14. See, e.g., Richard K. Neumann Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political
Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 161, 162 (2007). For earlier efforts at tracing partisan influence
in the impeachment process, see id. (describing the increased use, since 1968, of impeachment as a
“partisan political weapon”); Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as
a Madisonian Device, 49 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (1999) (describing the history of impeachment as “a history
of factional or partisan disputes over legitimacy”).
15. Mazie Hirono (@MazieHirono), TWITTER (Dec. 19, 2019, 9:17 AM),
https://twitter.com/maziehirono/status/1207711526666358784 (“The fact is @realDonaldTrump
shook down the Ukrainian President for his personal, political gain with a taxpayer-funded bribe. He
has yet to present a defense, which leaves us with the overwhelming evidence that he committed
impeachable offenses.”).
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approached.16
Trump’s second trial followed a similar pattern.17 In the midst of the trial,
prominent senators met with the President’s defense team.18 The ultimate
vote—acquitting President Trump for the second time—was again mostly
along party lines.19 That seven Republicans voted to convict the President
made the vote the “most bipartisan in history”; the bar was apparently quite
low.20 Such senatorial behavior and statements are inconsistent with the
constitutional obligation that senators impartially weigh all evidence
presented to them at impeachment trials. Partisanship risks destroying the
integrity of that crucial remedy for misbehavior by public officials.21 If
senators make up their minds beforehand, impeachment trials are at best
shams and at worst expensive and time-consuming political spectacles.
In light of the blatant partisanship of the most recent impeachment trials,
it might surprise some that the Founders envisioned something vastly
different. The relegation of the impeachment trial to the Senate—rather than
to the judicial branch, where most trials take place—was premised on the
Founders’ calculation that the Senate was “a tribunal sufficiently dignified

16. Steve Benen, On Impeachment, McConnell Vows ‘Total Coordination’ with Team Trump,
MSNBC (Dec. 13, 2019, 5:00 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/impeachmentmcconnell-vows-total-coordination-team-trump. Against this partisan backdrop, although not
necessarily in direct response to it, Justice John Roberts—whom the Constitution assigns to preside
over presidential impeachments—admonished the House managers and the President’s counsel after
a bitter exchange between the two sides: “I think it is appropriate at this point for me to admonish both
the House managers and [the P]resident’s counsel in equal terms to remember that they are addressing
the world’s greatest deliberative body . . . . Those addressing the Senate should remember where they
are.” Marianne LeVine, Chief Justice John Roberts Admonishes House Managers and White House
Counsel, POLITICO (Jan. 22, 2020, 6:21 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/22/robertsadmonishes-house-managers-wh-counsel-101990. Justice Roberts’s admonishment further evidences
some of the undignified conduct that occurred during the trial. See id.
17. See Sam Levine & Lauren Gambino, Donald Trump Acquitted in Second Impeachment Trial,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2021, 7:12 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/feb/13/donaldtrump-acquitted-impeachment-trial.
18. See Manu Raju & Alex Rogers, Three GOP Senators Meet with Trump’s Lawyers on Eve of
Impeachment
Defense
Presentation,
CNN
(Feb.
11,
2021,
7:55
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/11/politics/gop-senators-trump-impeachment-lawyers/index.html.
19. See Levine & Gambino, supra note 17.
20. Li Zhou, 7 Senate Republicans Vote To Convict Trump—The Most Bipartisan Impeachment
Trial Verdict Ever, VOX (Feb. 13, 2021, 3:57 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2021/2/13/22279879/7-senate-republicans-convict-trump-romney-collins-murkowski-sassecassidy-burr-toomey.
21. See Neumann, supra note 14.
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[and] sufficiently independent” to handle that serious process.22 Writing in
The Federalist Papers: No. 65, Alexander Hamilton argued that the Senate
must be insulated against the influences of political parties, among others.23
If the examples from the most recent impeachment trial are more than merely
anecdotal, impeachment no longer plays its constitutionally envisioned role.24
This Article draws attention to an often overlooked impeachment
procedure—the taking of the senatorial impeachment oath—and considers the
viability of reforming the impeachment process through that oath.25 Article I
of the Constitution provides that “[w]hen sitting for” the purpose of
impeachment, the Senate “shall be on Oath or Affirmation.”26 Since 1798,
senators have commenced impeachment trials by taking oaths to “do impartial
justice according to the Constitution and laws.”27 Impeachment trials were
designed to be insulated from legislative politics; the taking of the oath
initiates that categorically different type of congressional activity.28
Although one of the very few constitutionally mandatory impeachment
procedures, the oath receives only limited attention in the secondary literature
on impeachment. In Charles Black’s famous Impeachment: A Handbook
(described recently as the “most important book ever written on presidential
impeachment”),29 the oath is mentioned in just two sentences.30 Black

22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
23. See id.
24. See S. Res 479, 99th Cong. (1986). This Article evaluates partisanship in the narrow context
of impeachment. Even within that context, it examines only limited manifestations of partisanship—
namely those that appear to reflect senators’ violations of their oaths to do “impartial justice.” There
may be (and likely are) ways in which political parties benefit democratic politics, both generally and
specifically in the context of impeachments. See generally, e.g., SETH MASKET & HANS NOEL,
POLITICAL PARTIES (Peter Lesser et al. eds., 2021) (discussing the roles of political parties in the
American political system). This Article is not intended to critique all aspects of parties and does not
take a position on the virtues or vices of the American party system.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
27. S. Res. 479, 99th Cong. (1986). The impeachment oath has evolved over time. See discussion
infra Section II.C.
28. Jessica Taylor, Fractured into Factions? What the Founders Feared About Impeachment, NPR
(Nov. 18, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/18/779938819/fractured-into-factions-whatthe-founders-feared-about-impeachment.
29. Jane Chong, To Impeach a President: Applying the Authoritative Guide from Charles Black,
LAWFARE (July 20, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/impeach-president-applyingauthoritative-guide-charles-black.
30. See CHARLES L. BLACK JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 9–10 (Yale Univ. Press ed. 1974).
Philip Bobbitt recently coauthored a new edition of that classic, updating it with developments since
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recognized that the oath symbolizes the Senate’s assumption of a “different
role from its normal legislative one” but then moved on.31 Other impeachment
scholarship similarly gives the oath limited attention, if any at all.32 I argue
that the senators’ oath is significant and, if reformed, provides a much-needed
mechanism for restoring impeachment to the role envisioned for it by the
Founders.
In Part II, I briefly describe impeachment. First, I first focus on the
normative ideals undergirding impeachment.33 Hamilton envisioned a
dignified and impartial Senate, capable of setting aside the influences of
public opinion and political parties and deliberating about impeachment
charges.34 Since the Founding, the Senatorial Impeachment Oath Clause has
been understood to require that, during impeachment trials, senators “do
impartial justice.”35 Then, I explore statements from some of the most recent
impeachment trials.36 Those statements—by senators from both political
parties—suggest that impeachment has failed to achieve its oath-embodied
ideals. Finally, I briefly introduce the senatorial impeachment oath, as it has
developed through history.37

the original was published in 1974, but the new edition does not add anything more about the possible
role of the impeachment oath. See CHARLES L. BLACK JR. & PHILIP BOBBITT, IMPEACHMENT: A
HANDBOOK, NEW EDITION (Yale Univ. Press ed. 2018) (noting that the earlier edition of the book
“had been published before any definitive action was taken to remove President Nixon”).
31. BLACK, supra note 30, at 10.
32. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (Harv. Univ.
Press ed. 1973) (offering insight on the power of impeachment without considering the role of the
senatorial impeachment oath); FRANK O. BOWMAN III, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: A
HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT FOR THE AGE OF TRUMP 92 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 2019)
(mentioning briefly the senatorial impeachment oath as one of the two procedures mandated by the
Constitution); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2019) (discussing the constitutional and legal issues raised in
impeachment proceedings without considering the role of the senatorial impeachment oath);
Neumann, supra note 14, at 316 n.1089 (noting only that “each [s]enator must take an oath or
affirmation to try the case faithfully”). Other recent books targeted at a more general audience include
Neal Katyal and Sam Koppelman’s Impeach and Cass Sunstein’s Impeachment: A Citizen’s Guide,
but neither mention the senatorial impeachment oath. See NEAL KATYAL & SAM KOPPELMAN,
IMPEACH: THE CASE AGAINST DONALD TRUMP (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ’g Co. ed. 2019);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE (Harv. Univ. Press ed. 2017).
33. See discussion infra Section II.A.
34. See discussion infra Section II.A.
35. S. Res. 479, 99th Cong. (1986).
36. See discussion infra Section II.B.
37. See discussion infra Section II.C.

130

[Vol. 49: 123, 2022]

Impartial Justice:
Restoring Integrity to Impeachment Trials
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Part III describes several other oaths in the American legal system.38
Oaths have ancient origins and occupy many important roles today. I offer
three examples, each of which illuminates different potential features of the
senatorial impeachment oath.39 First, juror oaths demand of jurors the same
sort of impartiality that is demanded of senators during impeachment trials.40
Second, I describe oaths of public office—those taken by all public officials:
presidents, congresspeople, judges, and more.41 Like oaths for public office,
the senatorial impeachment oath is ostensibly unenforceable.42 Third, I offer
an example of an enforceable oath: witness oaths.43 When witnesses in court
testify falsely under oath, they may be prosecuted for perjury.44
Finally, Part IV presents two avenues for reform.45 First, I consider a
legal proposal: the possibility of making the senatorial impeachment oath
more like a witness’s oath, rendering the senatorial impeachment oath legally
enforceable.46 Such a law would require (1) executive power and (2)
independent authority to ensure that it would not be abused by persons—
especially presidents—facing impeachment.47 One possible model for such
an independent authority is the independent counsel, first established by the
Ethics in Government Act.48 Other laws regulating the conduct of senators—
such as those criminalizing bribery—demonstrate the workability of an
independent counsel-like law for impeachment trials.49 But such a law may
run afoul of the concerns over impeachment trials articulated by the Supreme

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See discussion infra Section III.A.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Section III.B.
See discussion infra Section III.C.
See Joel Cohen, INSIGHT: The Senate Impeachment Oath—Is Impartiality Even Possible?,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 16, 2020, 1:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/insightthe-senate-impeachment-oath-is-impartiality-even-possible (questioning the effectiveness of the
senatorial impeachment oath in light of senators’ blatant partisanship). It is true that the oath is
indirectly enforceable, as are other oaths taken by congresspeople, through elections. See, e.g., Randy
E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO.
L.J. 1, 24 n.115 (2018). This Article does not regard elections as a sufficient enforcement mechanism
for the senatorial impeachment oath. See discussion infra Section III.C.
43. See discussion infra Section III.D.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2018).
45. See discussion infra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
46. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
47. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
48. See infra Part IV.
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2018).
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Court in Nixon v. United States.50 According to the Nixon Court, any legal
reform may be unconstitutional to the extent that it threatens the finality of
impeachment judgments or the separation of powers.51
If a perjury-like law is ultimately unworkable, a second avenue for reform
is available: amending the Senate’s rules.52 Rule changes reflect the reasoned
judgment of the Senate (the body empowered to conduct impeachment trials),
and they were expressly endorsed by the Court in Nixon.53 I offer four
recommendations that would, if adopted, bolster the integrity of the
impeachment process: (1) prohibiting senators from discussing impeachment
trials with the prosecution (the House managers) or the defense (the party
subject to impeachment or her staff) outside of the trial setting; (2) allowing
for the for-cause removal of senators with obvious partial or partisan motives;
(3) expressly providing for the censure of senators who violate their oaths;
and (4) having senators vote anonymously using a secret ballot.54 Unlike a
perjury-inspired law, Senate rule changes would not be judicially
enforceable—a potentially serious weakness.55 Nonetheless, even if rule
changes only have the effect of bolstering the psychological impact of the
senatorial impeachment oath on senators, that might be enough to restore the
impeachment process to its constitutional pedestal.
Both the statutory and the rule-based proposals are only politically
feasible if politicians set aside partisan priorities in considering such
proposals. Given the importance of impeachment, and the fact that (as the
examples described in Part II will show) senators from both parties are guilty
of oath-breaking, both parties have vested interests in reform.56 If senators
consider reform proposals ex ante, behind something akin to John Rawls’s
“veil of ignorance,” either proposal described above will be politically
achievable.57
50. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 (1993).
51. Id.
52. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
53. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 250 (“In short, textual and historical evidence reveals that the Impeachment
Trial Clause was not meant to bind the hands of the Senate beyond establishing a set of minimal
procedures.”).
54. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
55. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 236.
56. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
57. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 15 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). Rawls
uses the “veil of ignorance” to hypothesize about what political order reasonable people would
consider just if those people were stripped of identifying characteristics—race, ethnicity, sex, etc. See
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There is an important caveat to note at this point. Even if adopted, the
proposals considered in this Article will not guarantee that impeachment trials
are perfect, only that those trials are better. These proposals will not protect
against other undesirable behavior during impeachment trials (such as
senators falling asleep),58 and they will not guarantee that senators reach the
“right” result from the evidence presented at those trials (even if we can agree
what “right” means).59 They also do not target any abuses of impeachment
that may take place in the House of Representatives or elsewhere.60
The senatorial impeachment oath articulates an ideal: impartiality.61
Some, if not all, senators will personally know the subject of an impeachment
trial, especially if the subject is the President. In contrast to jurors, senators
will thus come to impeachment trials with far more preconceptions and
biases.62 These realities make that ideal all the more difficult to achieve, but
they do not justify its abandonment. We expect jurors to set aside biases when
they sit in judgment; we should expect as much, if not more, from our elected
officials.
II. IMPEACHMENT
This Article explores “impartial justice” in the impeachment context.
This Part briefly describes that context in general terms and then discusses a
specific dysfunction observable in some of the most recent impeachment
trials: the apparent permeation of party loyalties. Partisanship reflects not just
a breach in the spirit but also in the letter of the impeachment process.63 I
thus conclude this Part by describing the history of the senatorial
impeachment oath, which instantiates the nonpartisan spirit—that of impartial

id.
58. See, e.g., Ewan Palmer, GOP Senator James Risch Appears To Fall Asleep During Opening
Day of Trump's Impeachment Trial, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 22, 2020, 5:06 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-impeachment-rial-james-risch-asleep-1483363 (noting that at
least one senator apparently fell asleep during the impeachment trial of President Trump).
59. See discussion infra Section III.A.
60. It is possible—perhaps likely—that partisanship will influence whether the House brings
articles of impeachment. The proposals in this Article target such partisanship in the Senate without
addressing it in the House.
61. See Cohen, supra note 42.
62. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
63. See Cohen, supra note 42.
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justice—in the process.64
Even at the Founding, impeachment was not a novel concept.65 Frank
Bowman shows that the Founders were intimately familiar with the
impeachment process from several high-profile colonial impeachments,66 and
by 1787, ten states already included impeachment provisions in their
postrevolutionary constitutions.67 Against that background, the following was
included in the closing lines of Article II of the Constitution: “The President,
Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”68
As its placement in Article II suggests, and as records show, “[a]lmost all
the discussion about impeachment in the Constitutional Convention
concerned the presidency.”69 (Impeachment is also described in Article I,
principally as a power to be exercised by Congress.)70 Bowman and others
have written extensively about these debates, especially over the meaning of
“high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” and this Article will defer much of the
historical discussion to them.71 But insofar as it bears on the American
impeachment experience, it is worth emphasizing the extent to which

64. See discussion infra Section II.C.
65. See, e.g., Neumann, supra note 14, at 167–68 (describing the precolonial English use of
impeachment).
66. See BOWMAN, supra note 32, at 50–65.
67. See id. at 50. Prior to the insertion of impeachment provisions into postrevolutionary state
constitutions, however, “many of the colonists had retained only a vague sense that their legislatures
possessed the power.” GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787,
at 141 (Univ. of N.C. Press ed. 1998). “Hence writing the impeachment process into the Revolutionary
constitutions was understandably confused, not only in the designation of the officials liable to
impeachment but in the determination of the body trying the impeachment.” Id. at 142.
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
69. BOWMAN, supra note 32, at 89.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3.
71. See BOWMAN, supra note 32, at 89–111; see also BERGER, supra note 32, at 53–102
(discussing meaning of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors”); H. LOWELL BROWN, HIGH CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS IN PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 1–34 (Palgrave Macmillan ed. 2010) (same);
GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 105–13 (same). One of the most extreme positions about impeachable
crimes is taken by Joseph Isenbergh, who argues that Congress is affirmatively obligated to impeach
a president for “[t]reason, [b]ribery, or other [h]igh [c]rimes and [m]isdemeanors.” Joseph Isenbergh,
Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 63–64
(1999). Isenbergh focuses on the preceding language, “shall be removed,” which requires
congressional impeachment. Id. But see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, IMPEACHMENT: WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNOW 71–72 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 2018) (disputing Isenbergh’s argument).
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impeachment was apparently designed primarily to address executive
misconduct.72
From its constitutional inception, impeachment has been a serious and
important process.73 Chief Justice William Rehnquist characterized it as a
“wild card” in the Constitution because it could disrupt the constitutional
system of checks and balances.74 As further support, Josh Chafetz showed
that, during the Constitutional Convention, impeachment was contemplated
as a desirable alternative to assassination for removing “obnoxious”
presidents.75
A. Ideals of Impeachment
Though not discussed in much detail at the Convention,76 the
impeachment provisions received greater attention during the ratification of
the Constitution.77 In Federalist No. 65, for example, Alexander Hamilton
defended the idea of empowering the Senate—rather than some other body—
to conduct the impeachment process.78 Hamilton claimed that impeachable

72. See Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347, 348 (2010)
(“[Benjamin] Franklin, recognizing that presidents might sometimes ‘render [themselves] obnoxious,’
recommended [impeachment as] a formal, constitutional mechanism for bringing them to justice . . . .”
(second alteration in original)).
73. But see ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 109 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969) (claiming that, in America, impeachment “is both less formidable and less
effective”). It is true that impeachment in the precolonial European context was likely far more
powerful and far deadlier. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 36 (“The House of Commons would
make the decision whether to impeach, and if it chose to do so, a trial would be held in the House of
Lords. The penalty for conviction could be severe; it could even include execution.”). Even if the
American impeachment power is relatively less potent than was its British ancestor, it is undeniably a
powerful and important component of American constitutionalism.
74. William H. Rehnquist, Impeachment Clause: A Wild Card in the Constitution, 85 NW. U. L.
REV. 903, 903–04 (1991); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
279, 281 (1998) (observing that “[t]he prospect of impeachment can be highly destabilizing to
government”).
75. See Chafetz, supra note 72, at 347–48 (“[I]mpeachment was an attempt to domesticate, to
tame, assassination.”); see also Jason J. Vicente, Impeachment: A Constitutional Primer, 3 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 117, 121 (1998) (recognizing the same historical relationship between impeachment and
assassination).
76. See Neumann, supra note 14, at 174.
77. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 65, 66, 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
78. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton). James Madison, by contrast, preferred the
Supreme Court, which Madison thought would be better able to exercise impartiality. See, e.g., PETER
CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635–1805, at 70–75 (Yale Univ.
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offenses “may with peculiar propriety be denominated [political].”79
Hamilton did not mean by this that impeachable offenses were partisan;
instead, as he makes clear, they are political in the sense of being “injuries
done immediately to the society itself.”80
Federalist No. 65 is important because it clarifies the role that the Senate
was expected to play in the impeachment process.81 Hamilton appeals to the
Senate in its “judicial character,” and he suggests that the Senate may be the
only institution with sufficient political capital and integrity to conduct
impeachment trials with the requisite independence.82 He thus validated
Gouverneur Morris’s claim, made during the Convention, that “there could be
no danger that the Senate would say untruly on their oaths that the President
was guilty of crimes”83—a claim, as we will see in the next Part, perhaps more
hopeful than accurate. Half a century later, Alexis de Tocqueville described
the “judicial . . . form” of the Senate in impeachments: “[T]he senators are
bound to conform to the solemn formalities of procedure.”84
But the judicial role of the Senate was not merely procedural; it was not
just about appearing independent.85 The impeachment process demands of
senators that they assume a fundamentally different role from that of
legislators.86 In perhaps the most illuminating passage of Federalist No. 65,
Hamilton asks rhetorically,
Where else than in the Senate could have been found a
tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent?
What other body would be likely to feel CONFIDENCE
ENOUGH IN ITS OWN SITUATION, to preserve, unawed

Press ed. 1984). Madison was ultimately unsuccessful in his efforts to persuade others at the
Convention, but many early drafts of the Constitution assigned impeachment to the judiciary. William
Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 236 (2012) (showing that earlier drafts
of the Constitution assigned impeachment to the “supreme tribunal”). It was not until late in the
Convention that the trial power was shifted to the Senate. See BLACK, supra note 30, at 10.
79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
80. Id.
81. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
82. Id.
83. SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 49 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 551 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
84. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 73, at 108.
85. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
86. See id.
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and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an
INDIVIDUAL accused, and the REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE PEOPLE, HIS ACCUSERS?87
Far from being a political process, Hamilton suggests that impeachment
trials ought to be “independent,” “uninfluenced,” and “impartial[].”88 He also
expressly identifies three groups whose influence should not intrude into
impeachment trials: (1) the “community,” (2) the “representatives of the
people,” and (3) political parties.89 It is the last group that receives the most
sustained attention.90 Hamilton was concerned about “parties more or less
friendly or inimical to the accused,” worrying that impeachment “decision[s]
[would] be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the
real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.”91 At the time he was writing,
political parties—today, mainly Democrats and Republicans—were less
coherently organized.92 But even then, parties threatened the integrity of
political decisions.93 Hamilton argued that vesting the impeachment power in
the Senate would be sufficient to insulate impeachment trials from the
influence of parties.94
The belief that the Senate could conduct impartial impeachment trials was

87. Id. Hamilton thought the Supreme Court lacked the political authority to be a “substitute for
the Senate.” Id.; see also BERGER, supra note 32, at 119 (“[T]he trial by the Senate would draw much
of the lightning[,] and as the lawyers among the Founders knew from their own law practice, appellate
tribunals generally do not operate in a superheated atmosphere.”). Hamilton also rejected the
possibility of forming a hybrid of the Court and the Senate for impeachment trials. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
88. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Turley, supra note 14, at 3–4 (“The
Senate function is . . . ‘political’ in a uniquely Madisonian sense. The Senate trial serves as a unique
forum for resolving highly divisive questions over the legitimacy of a [p]resident or judge to continue
to exercise constitutional authority.”).
89. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., MARTY COHEN, DAVID KAROL, HANS NOEL & JOHN ZALLER, THE PARTY DECIDES:
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER REFORM 47–65 (Univ. of Chi. Press ed. 2008)
(describing the early American development of political parties).
93. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). James Madison famously worried about the
related role of factions in American democracy. See id. For Madison, factions were a specific but
common type of association “united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse[] to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”
Id.
94. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
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rooted in a more general faith in that institution.95 Gordon Wood, for example,
describes the Founders’ vision of the “exalted Senate” as composed of social
and political elites who would behave as had aristocrats under the old
European monarchies.96 The Antifederalists feared the Senate for just the
reason that the Federalists lauded it: “[I]ts very structure and detachment from
the people would work to exclude any kind of actual and local interest
representation and prevent those who were not rich, well born, or prominent
from exercising political power.”97 The features of the Senate that made it so
desirable to the Federalists—its dignity, its removal from pedestrian interests,
its natural elitism—also made it the institution that the Founders thought most
capable of securely conducting impeachment trials.98
Many more recent scholars echo the sentiments expressed in Federalist
No. 65. Akhil Amar urges senators to “damn the polls” and follow the law;99
Charles Black describes the Senate as functioning “much like . . . a judicial
court”;100 and Cass Sunstein argues that senators of both parties should engage
in a “mutual arms control agreement” to use impeachment only in the “most
extreme cases.”101 John McGinnis adds that the constitutional design of
impeachment—empowering the legislative branch—reflects the Founders’
commitment to impartiality: “By forcing the House and Senate to act as
tribunals rather than merely as legislative bodies, the Framers infused the
process with notions of due process to prevent impeachment from becoming

95. See id.
96. WOOD, supra note 67, at 515.
97. Id. at 516.
98. See THE CLINTON SCANDAL AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 142, 146
(Mark J. Rozell & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2000). For more recent validation of the Founders’ decision to
vest the impeachment trial power in the Senate, see id. at 144 (noting that the Clinton impeachment
illustrates “the vulnerability of the federal judiciary to political retaliation” because “some of the most
important factors that helped Clinton survive the threat of removal (i.e., public support and media
scrutiny) are absent from lower federal judges’ impeachment proceedings. . . . [A]bout which the
public is largely indifferent”).
99. Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 307 (1999)
(“Sometimes, the rule of law does require a [s]enator to damn the polls. If in her heart a [s]enator
thinks the President is innocent in fact (he actually did not do it) or in law (even if he did it, it is not a
‘high crime or misdemeanor’), then she must vote not guilty—even if she thereby offends her
constituents, who want the man’s head.”).
100. BLACK, supra note 30, at 10; see also Philip C. Bobbitt, Impeachment: A Handbook, 128 YALE
L.J.F. 515, 556 (2018) (“The Senate . . . sits as a law court.”).
101. Sunstein, supra note 74, at 305. Sunstein worried that, in the Clinton impeachment, the House
had set “a precedent that could threaten to turn impeachment into a political weapon.” Id. at 309.
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a common tool of party politics.”102 McGinnis links impartiality to broader
separation of powers concerns.103
Today, the Hamiltonian faith in the Senate is preserved in the oath taken
by senators before impeachment trials. As will be discussed in greater detail
below, senators take an oath to do impartial justice, committing themselves to
the Founders’ vision for proper impeachment procedures.104
That
commitment is not a mere paean to history. Impartiality is a living and
perpetual feature of impeachment, reaffirmed through the oath at the start of
every impeachment trial. The perennial reiteration of the oath makes it all the
more tragic when senators fail to satisfy the obligation it imposes.
B. The Diminution of Impeachment Ideals
Unfortunately, Hamilton’s defense of the Senate’s role in impeachment
trials rested on a potentially naïve optimism about senators’ integrity and
ability to remain impartial. History quickly exposed the extent of his naïveté.
In his important review of American impeachments, Richard Neumann shows
that “[b]eginning soon after the formation of the federal government,
impeachment was used as a partisan political weapon.”105 As the young
republic began to develop the norms and institutions that were supposed to
insulate the American legal system from the whims of raw partisan power,
impeachment was quickly adopted as a weapon in partisan warfare.106
1. Early American Impeachments
The first attempted impeachment of Senator William Blount in 1798
exemplifies Neumann’s position.107 Acting as a private citizen, Blount

102. John O. McGinnis, Impeachment: The Structural Understanding, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 650,
663 (1999).
103. See id. (“The structure that confines legislative response to executive misconduct to removal
upon impeachment and conviction also serves essential constitutional values—the promotion of
impartial deliberation and the protection of the separation of powers.”); see also Keith E. Whittington,
An Impeachment Should Not Be a Partisan Affair, LAWFARE (May 16, 2017, 9:03 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/impeachment-should-not-be-partisan-affair (lamenting the political
systemic implications of purely partisan impeachments).
104. See discussion infra Section II.C.
105. Neumann, supra note14.
106. See id. at 177.
107. See id. at 175.
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entered into a complicated scheme, the main object of which was to take the
land that later became Louisiana from the Spanish (in part with the aid of the
British, who were at war with the Spanish in Europe).108 So heinous was
Blount’s alleged scheme that then-First Lady Abigail Adams lamented that
there was no guillotine in Philadelphia to punish him adequately.109 But
Blount had already been expelled from Congress when the articles of
impeachment reached the Senate, so impeachment was unnecessary, as a
practical matter, to remove him from government.110 Instead, Neumann
suggests, some in the Federalist-dominated Congress sought to weaponize
impeachment—which is not limited by the Constitution to only criminal
acts—to “disqualify from federal office any citizen whose politics Congress
did not like.”111 As further evidence, Neumann notes that the impeachment
took place contemporaneously with the passage of the Sedition Act, which
“criminalized the Federalists’ adversaries by turning criticism of the
Federalists into a crime.”112
Partisanship also manifested in the second federal impeachment—that of
John Pickering, a federal judge in the district of New Hampshire.113 At that
time, federal power had shifted to President Thomas Jefferson and the
Jeffersonian Republicans.114 Part of the Jeffersonian Republican project
involved an assault on the federal judiciary, and Judge Pickering was a prime
target for the Jeffersonian Republicans’ attacks.115
By most accounts, Pickering should not have remained on the federal
bench, politics aside; by the time of his impeachment, he was showing signs
of mental deterioration on the bench and was developing a reputation for
drunkenness.116 According to one historian, “The unfortunate old man had
been an insane drunkard for some time and was clearly unable to perform his
duties as a federal judge. His removal could be defended on the unassailable
108. See id.
109. See WILLIAM H. MASTERSON, WILLIAM BLOUNT 318 (1954).
110. See Neumann, supra note 14, at 177.
111. Id. at 181. But see id. (“Universal impeachment was probably only a strategy preferred by a
faction within the Federalist Party. The Federalist Party was not monolithic. Like most political
parties, it had both extremist and moderate elements.”).
112. Id. at 178.
113. See id. at 185.
114. See id. at 186.
115. See id. This was the context in which Marbury v. Madison was decided. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803); see also Neumann, supra note 14, at 183.
116. See Neumann, supra note 14, at 185.
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ground of concern for the purity of the judiciary.”117 But even equipped with
apparently legitimate concerns about Judge Pickering’s suitability for
continued judicial service, the impeachment process became politically
charged.118 Partisanship appeared in congressional debates over the nature of
impeachable offenses: Federalist senators defended Pickering by arguing for
a narrower definition of high crimes and misdemeanors, while Jeffersonian
Republicans defended a more expansive one.119 The more expansive
definition served a broader function that demonstrates why Pickering may
have been targeted for impeachment.120 He was low-hanging fruit; if Judge
Pickering could be successfully removed from office, Jeffersonian
Republicans would be able to remove other Federalist judges as well.121
“[B]oth parties saw him as first blood in a campaign to oust Federalists from
the judiciary.”122
At the conclusion of his trial, the Senate voted strictly along party lines to
convict and remove Judge Pickering from office.123 And so, Judge Pickering’s
impeachment case “became a political rather than a legal issue,” and
“[i]nstead of standing in American history as the correct precedent for all
future cases of judicial impeachment, it became a tragic blunder which
reflected discredit upon everyone connected with it.”124
As the examples of Blount and Pickering make clear, early impeachments
were not free from partisanship.125 They were sites of “vitriolic pitched battle”
between still-nascent American political parties vying for control.126
Eventually, though, partisanship in the impeachment process receded, and the
country saw a century-long period of nonpartisan impeachments.127 With just
a few exceptions, Neumann persuasively demonstrates that between 1868 and
1968, impeachments were nonpartisan.128 Only since the 1980s, according to
117. Lynn W. Turner, The Impeachment of John Pickering, 54 AM. HIST. REV. 485, 487 (1949).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. Neumann, supra note 14, at 187.
123. See id. at 186.
124. Turner, supra note 117; see also Neumann, supra note 14, at 186 (describing the political facets
of Pickering’s impeachment trial).
125. See Neumann, supra note 14, at 187.
126. Id.
127. See Neumann, supra note 14, at 227.
128. See id. at 162.
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Neumann, has partisanship returned to the impeachment stage.129
2. Modern American Impeachments
Before the first impeachment charges against President Donald Trump
had even reached the Senate, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell
announced that he had made up his mind about the quality of the House’s
evidence130 and claimed to be in “total coordination with the White House
counsel” as the impeachment trial neared.131 McConnell told reporters, “I’m
not an impartial juror. This is a political process. There’s not anything
judicial about it . . . . I’m not impartial about this at all.”132 Senator Lindsey
Graham stated that he would not even “pretend to be a fair juror.”133 While
McConnell and Graham pledged to acquit, Senator Mazie Hirono suggested
she was ready to convict even before the trial began.134 And some questioned
whether the six senators competing for the Democratic nomination to run
against President Trump—Kamala Harris, Cory Booker, Amy Klobuchar,
Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders, and Michael Bennett—were capable of
impartially deciding the impeachment matter.135
129. See id. Neumann makes the case that political usage of impeachment has been largely onesided: “[S]ince 1968, some elements in the Republican Party have been willing to use impeachment
as a partisan weapon; to inflict political damage on their opponents and as part of a campaign to control
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.” Id. In this Article, I focus on the bipartisan abuse—
by both parties, but not by both parties together—of impeachment. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
130. See McConnell Remarks on House Democrats’ Impeachment of President Trump,
SENATE.GOV NEWSROOM (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.republicanleader.senate.gov/newsroom/
remarks/mcconnell-remarks-on-house-democrats-impeachment-of-president-trump-.
131. Benen, supra note 16. Based on McConnell’s public statements, Public Citizen filed a
complaint against McConnell with the Senate Ethics Committee. See Craig Holman et al., Violation
of Oath of Office by Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.): Senate Ethics Committee Needs To Restore
Impartiality in Impeachment Proceedings, PUBLIC CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/article/violationof-oath-of-office-by-sen-mitch-mcconnell-r-ky/?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=c340cdb6-bcc84a33-9075-49043c6ebe0e (last visited Sept. 9, 2021).
132. Ledyard King & Maureen Groppe, Can Senators Who Have Already Voiced Opinions Do
‘Impartial Justice’ at Trump Impeachment Trial?, USA TODAY (Jan. 18, 2020, 9:33 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/01/16/impeachment-senators-pledge-impartialjustice-trump-trial/4488539002/.
133. Colby Itkowitz, Sen. Graham: ‘Not Trying To Pretend To Be a Fair Juror’, WASH. POST (Dec.
14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/lindsey-graham-not-trying-to-pretend-to-be-afair-juror-here/2019/12/14/dcaad02c-1ea8-11ea-b4c1-fd0d91b60d9e_story.html.
134. See Mazie Hirono (@MazieHirono), TWITTER (Dec. 19, 2019, 9:17 AM),
https://twitter.com/maziehirono/status/1207711526666358784.
135. See Jason Smith, Presidential Candidates Serving in the Senate Must Recuse Themselves from
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The ultimate vote count from the impeachment trial further reflects the
lack of impartiality.136 With just one exception (Senator Mitt Romney), all
Republican senators voted to acquit President Trump, and all Democratic
senators voted to convict—suggesting that partisanship, rather than objective
analysis of evidence presented, dictated the outcome of the trial.137
Republican Senator Marco Rubio, after voting to acquit, said that even if a
president’s actions “meet a standard of impeachment,” it might not be “in the
best interest of the country to remove a [p]resident from office.”138 Rubio
defended his vote as resulting from his “political judgment” about the best
outcome of the trial.139
What to many was so remarkable about the second impeachment trial—
that seven Republicans voted to convict now-former President Trump—only
compounds the concern that partisanship shapes impeachment trials.140
Unsurprisingly, charges of partisanship were made by President Trump’s

Impeachment Proceedings, HILL (Dec. 9, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/politics/473674-presidential-candidates-serving-in-the-senate-must-recuse.
136. See Ian Millhser, Mitt Romney Just Did Something That Literally No Senator Has Ever Done
Before, VOX (Feb. 5, 2020, 4:25 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/5/21125118/mittromneyimpeachment-vote-history.
137. See id.; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Historical and Constitutional Significance of the
Impeachment and Trial of President Clinton, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 356 (1999) (noting the partyline votes to convict President Clinton in the 1999 impeachment trial).
138. Marco Rubio, My Statement on the President’s Impeachment Trial, MEDIUM (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://medium.com/@SenatorMarcoRubio/my-statement-on-the-presidents-impeachment-trial9669e82ccb43. Rubio’s comments raise a separate issue as well: the proper burden of proof to be
applied in impeachment trials. See id. What standard to apply—whether “by a reasonable doubt,” as
in criminal trials, by a “preponderance of the evidence,” as in civil trials, or something else—is an
open question. See GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 114; Neumann, supra note 14, at 316 (footnote
omitted) (“The Senate has never held itself to any particular evidentiary burden of persuasion, and the
result is that each [s]enator applies whatever burden of persuasion the [s]enator prefers—or no burden
at all.”).
139. Rubio, supra note 138. Some, such as John McGinnis, have noted the importance of political
judgment in the impeachment process. See McGinnis, supra note 102, at 657 (“[Impeachment]
requires political judgment of the highest order; weighing both the short and the long-term risks to the
[r]epublic of permitting such an official to remain in office against the damage that might be done by
removing him.”). But McGinnis was referring to the judgment exercisable by members of the House
of Representatives, where such judgment is appropriate. See id. Rubio, as an oath-bound Senator, is
not in a similar position to exercise such judgment. See id.
140. Although the articles of impeachment were approved in the House of Representatives while
President Trump was in office, the Senate declined to receive them until after President Trump left
office. See U.S. News Staff, READ: McConnell Speech After Trump’s Impeachment Trial Acquittal,
U.S. NEWS (Feb. 14, 2021, 11:36 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2021-0214/read-mcconnell-speech-after-trumps-impeachment-trial-acquittal.
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defense team before and during the second trial. David Schoen (one of the
President’s attorneys), for example, complained, “This is nothing less than the
political weaponization of the impeachment process.”141 In the closing lines
of its defense brief, the team claimed, “[I]ndulging House Democrats[’]
hunger for this political theater is a danger to our [r]epublic, democracy[,] and
the rights that we hold dear.”142 More significantly, after voting (again) to
acquit Mr. Trump, Senator McConnell lambasted the former President for his
“practical[] and moral[] responsib[ility]” for the violence on January 6,
2021.143 McConnell’s speech received widespread attention; while some
praised his bravery for speaking out against the former President, others
criticized McConnell for his unwillingness to convict the President, whose
responsibility was beyond question.
Republicans, including McConnell, defended their votes in the second
trial on procedural grounds.144 Although conceding that the House’s articles
of impeachment were adopted before the end of President Trump’s term,
Republican senators claimed the Senate could not try a former official.145
Before the trial, Senator Rand Paul led an unsuccessful effort to declare the
proceedings unconstitutional.146 (Although five Republican senators voted
against Paul's proposal, all the remaining Senate Republicans—and no
Democrats—supported it.)147 Such procedural efforts were in spite of the
majority consensus that such proceedings were constitutional.148 Those
141. Republicans Pan Trump Lawyer’s Rambling Case: Impeachment Update, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Feb. 9, 2021, 3:07 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-09/trump-trial-startswith-constitutional-fight-impeachment-update.
142. Read Trump’s Impeachment Defense Memo, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/08/us/trump-defense-impeachment-trial.html.
143. U.S. News Staff, supra note 140; see also Lexi Lonas, GOP Sen. Cassidy: ‘I Voted To Convict
Trump
Because
He
Is
Guilty,’
HILL
(Feb.
13,
2021,
5:14
PM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/538774-gop-sen-cassidy-i-voted-to-convict-trump-because-heis-guilty.
144. See U.S. News Staff, supra note 140.
145. See, e.g., id. (claiming that “former President Trump is constitutionally not eligible for
conviction”).
146. See Jordain Carney, Just Five GOP Senators Vote Trump Impeachment Trial Is Constitutional,
HILL (Jan. 26, 2021, 3:27 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/535925-senate-rejects-pauleffort-to-declare-trump-impeachment-trial.
147. See id.
148. See JARED P. COLE & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10565, THE IMPEACHMENT
AND TRIAL OF A FORMER PRESIDENT 1–2 (2021) (observing that “most scholars who have closely
examined the question have concluded that Congress has authority to extend the impeachment process
to officials who are no longer in office”); Natasha Bertrand, Constitutional Law Scholars on
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efforts exemplify a bad faith attempt to conceal what was ultimately a partisan
process; Republican senators did not want to convict their Republican
President.149
The 1999 impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton was also permeated
by politics, albeit to a lesser extent.150 At that time, Senator Chuck Schumer
(who had voted against impeachment as a Representative in 1998 and was
subsequently elected to the Senate in time to participate in the trial) said of
the Senate trial that it would be “quite different than a jury” trial, and of
impeachment generally, “The standard is different. It’s supposed to be a little
bit judicial and a little bit legislative–political.”151 Philip Bobbitt blames the
“fiasco of the Clinton impeachment” for the contemporary loss of confidence
in the ability of Congress to properly conduct impeachment.152 Bobbitt
worried after the failed impeachment of President Clinton that,
[O]wing to the zeal of some (and perhaps the self-absorption
of others), we have compromised the habits of decorum,
fastidious withholding of judgment, impartial procedures,
detachment from partisanship, and insistence on

Impeaching
Former
Officers,
POLITICO
(Jan.
21,
2021,
2:01
PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/21/legal-scholars-federalist-society-trump-convict-461089
(citing a public letter from roughly 150 law professors concluding that former presidents can be
impeached); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, The Constitutionality of Trying a Former President
Impeached
While
in
Office,
LAWFARE
(Feb.
3,
2021,
12:42
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/constitutionality-trying-former-president-impeached-while-office
(arguing that it is constitutional to impeach a former president); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Impeach
an Ex-President? The Founders Were Clear: That’s How They Wanted It, POLITICO (Feb. 11, 2021,
6:31 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/02/11/donald-trump-impeachment-expresident-founders-468769 (same). But see, e.g., Robert A. Levy, Impeachment of an Ex-President Is
Unconstitutional, CATO INST. (Jan. 22, 2021, 10:59 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/impeachmentex-president-unconstitutional (arguing that former presidents cannot be impeached); U.S. News Staff,
supra note 140 (“Brilliant scholars argue both sides of the jurisdictional question. The text is
legitimately ambiguous.”).
149. See Mike DeBonis & Seung Min Kim, Nearly All GOP Senators Vote Against Impeachment
Trial for Trump, Signaling Likely Acquittal, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2021, 6:17 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gop-senators-to-question-basis-for-trump-impeachmentsignaling-likely-acquittal/2021/01/26/cd7397dc-6002-11eb-9061-07abcc1f9229_story.html.
150. See Neumann, supra note 14, at 273–300 (discussing the political and partisan circumstances
surrounding President Clinton’s impeachment).
151. Andrew Kaczynski & Em Steck, Schumer Said in 1999 Senate Wasn’t Like a Jury Box and
Was ‘Susceptible to the Whims of Politics,’ CNN (Dec. 27, 2019, 4:19 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/27/politics/chuck-schumer-impeachment-1999-kfile/index.html.
152. Bobbitt, supra note 100, at 519.
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fundamental fairness that [Charles] Black thought necessary
to the due process of impeachment. We are more inclined to
treat impeachment as a political struggle for public opinion,
waged in the media, and less like the grand inquest
envisioned by the Constitution’s Framers.153
Nonetheless, the partisanship in 1999 was perhaps less extreme.154 Nina
Totenberg—who reported on all three recent impeachment trials—claims that
“[i]n contrast to Senator McConnell, both [then-Senate Majority Leader
Trent] Lott [(a Republican)] and [then-Senate Minority Leader Tom] Daschle
[(a Democrat)] sought to preserve the notion of neutrality at the trial and tried
to separate themselves from the White House.”155 The Senate also agreed
unanimously on the initial rules that would govern the process.156 Finally, the
final vote to acquit President Clinton was less rigidly partisan, with ten
Republican senators voting with their Democratic colleagues to acquit.157
And yet, hope is not lost. As President Trump’s first trial showed, not all
senators disregard the obligations of impartiality.158 Before the start of
President Trump’s first impeachment trial, Senator Tim Kaine urged his
colleagues to take their oaths seriously: “As individuals, we may have biases,
but that special oath implies profound trust that we will remove ourselves from
the partisan passion of the moment and exercise judgment with sole regard for
impartial justice.”159 Likewise, Senator Mitt Romney cited the oath of
impartiality when defending his vote to convict President Trump on one of
the impeachment charges.160
Notwithstanding such outlier virtue signaling by Senators Kaine and
153. Id.
154. See Nina Totenberg, How the Senate Tried Clinton in a ‘Respectable Way,’ NPR (Dec. 19,
2019, 7:22 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/19/789355645/how-the-senate-tried-clinton-in-arespectable-way.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See Gerhardt, supra note 137, at 357–58.
158. See, e.g., Tim Kaine, Sen. Tim Kaine: My Colleagues Must Be Impartial in Donald Trump’s
Impeachment
Trial,
USA
TODAY
(Jan.
7,
2020,
2:17
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/01/06/sen-tim-kaine-colleagues-constitutionimpartial-impeachment-column/2796612001/.
159. Id.
160. See Full Transcript: Mitt Romney’s Speech Announcing Vote To Convict Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/mitt-romney-impeachment-speechtranscript.html.
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Romney, the preceding examples call into question whether impeachment
functions as intended—as a “dignified” and “independent” adjudication of
“injuries done immediately to the society itself.”161 If impeachment trials are
no longer conducted (and, perhaps never have been) with appropriate
seriousness, insulated from political allegiances and partisan alignments, then
impeachment will not serve the constitutional role it was assigned.
Again, the permeation of partisanship into the impeachment process is not
wholly new.162 It has been a staple of interbranch rivalries since early
American history.163 But partisan impeachments should be concerning—even
more so if, as Neumann observes and the examples above confirm, the role of
partisanship in impeachments is growing.164
Concern over partisanship in the impeachment context is consistent with
other views about the role of impeachment trials in democratic governance as
well.165 Jonathan Turley, for example, argues that:
In crafting the American legislative process, Madison sought
to address the destabilizing effects of factional disputes
within democratic systems. Madison believed that leaving
such disputes unaddressed would create intrigue and
instability within a political system. For that reason, the
Madisonian process does not seek to suppress, but to
transform factional interests. This emphasis on resolving
factional disputes gives the system the ability to withstand
crushing pressures during periods of enormous social,
political, and economic turmoil. Presidential impeachment
161. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
162. See Neumann, supra note 14, at 164–65.
163. See id. (“Historically, there have been four great confrontations between or among branches
of the federal government: (1) the struggle between the Federalist-dominated judiciary on one hand[]
and the Jefferson Administration and Jeffersonian Congress on the other in the early years of the
nineteenth century; (2)[] from 1865 to 1869, the confrontation between President Andrew Johnson
and the Radical Republican Congress over Reconstruction; (3) the conflict, which peaked in 1937,
between the [a]dministration of Franklin D. Roosevelt and a Supreme Court that repeatedly struck
down his New Deal legislation as unconstitutional; and (4) the on-going struggle, which began in
1968, in and between the two elected branches on several issues but, most particularly, over the
composition of the Supreme Court. Impeachment as a highly partisan exercise of legislative power,
in which one branch of government attacks another, played a central role in all of these confrontations
except the struggle between Roosevelt and the Supreme Court.”).
164. See id. at 162.
165. See Turley, supra note 14, at 1–2.
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cases constitute the most extreme and the most dangerous
form of factional dispute in the legislative branch. When a
[p]resident is impeached, the House certifies not only that
impeachable conduct may have occurred but that a majority
of House members question the legitimacy of the [p]resident
to govern. Such cases will often arrive at the Senate with the
support and the opposition of large and passionate factional
groups. As will be shown, the history of impeachment is
largely a history of such factional or partisan disputes over
legitimacy. This history, however, also shows how factional
interests can be transformed under the catalytic influence of
a full Senate trial.166
Turley envisions impeachment as normatively fruitful beyond the
Hamiltonian adjudication of public misconduct.167 He conceives of
impeachments as serving a specific political function as “Madisonian
device[s].”168 At first glance, he seems to be endorsing partisanship in the
impeachment process as a means of exhausting partisan (factional)
energies.169 But upon closer examination, Turley’s reasons for praising
impeachment trials would not accommodate the examples of partisanship
described above.170 He writes that “[t]o serve a Madisonian function in
resolving factional disputes, the central obligation of the Senate trial must be
a faithful presentation of the allegations, evidence, and witnesses in the
case.”171 To the extent that partisanship detracts from substantive debates, it
precludes the political discourse underlying Turley’s position. Recent
impeachments, in which the substance of impeachment charges is buried in
the flurry of partisan charges and counter-charges, evidence the extent to
which Turley’s conception of factionalism-exhausting impeachment trials has
been unrealized in recent decades.172 The exhaustion of factional energies
cannot take place when substantive debates are subordinated to bad faith
partisanship. If anything is exhausted, it is the capacity of the impeachment

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
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See id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
See supra text accompanying notes 161–85.
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process to check misconduct.
So far, we have discussed the constitutional vision of impeachment and
its denigration. But there are two wrinkles in the story sketched above that,
while not impacting the conclusions to be drawn from that story, render it a
bit more complex. First, the Senate’s role in impeachment was altered by the
Seventeenth Amendment. That amendment provides for the direct election of
senators, rather than election by state legislatures.173 As a result of that
change, as Stephen Presser notes, “the Senate is no longer insulated from
popular election.”174 On its face, shifting senators’ selection processes and
the group(s) to which they are directly accountable might seem to recast the
role they would be expected to play in impeachment trials.175 But the
Seventeenth Amendment likely had no effect on the constitutional role
senators were expected to play in impeachment trials.176 The amendment
perhaps made the senators’ role in impeachment trials more difficult by
reducing the distance between them and the people against whose influence
they must insulate themselves.177 Nothing about the text or history of that
amendment, though, suggests it was designed to affect senators’ roles or
responsibilities. In fact, as Presser argues, the change makes it “doubly
important” that senators “try to approach the impeachment of the President as
objectively as possible.”178 To the extent that the Seventeenth Amendment
was about increasing democratic accountability of the legislative branch,
partisanship appears to stand in the way of the ideals that amendment sought
to realize.
The second wrinkle in the impeachment story told above has to do with
the bases of impeachment—the charges brought in the articles of
impeachment by the House of Representatives. The Constitution states that
impeachment may be for “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors”—a category potentially broader than merely indictable
173. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one
vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the State legislatures.”).
174. Stephen B. Presser, Would George Washington Have Wanted Bill Clinton Impeached?, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 666, 673 (1999).
175. See, e.g., Jane Chong, This Is Not the Senate the Framers Imagined, ATLANTIC (Jan. 21, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/not-senate-framers-imagined/605017/.
176. See Turley, supra note 14, at 125.
177. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
178. Presser, supra note 174.
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criminal offenses.179 According to Michael Gerhardt, who has written
extensively about impeachment, the real debate today is “over the range of
nonindictable offenses on which an impeachment may be based.”180 Is it
possible that discretion is a necessary feature of impeachment trials because
of the open-ended category of impeachable offenses? And, if so, can
discretion legitimately manifest as partisanship without running afoul of
impeachment’s constitutional ideal?
In order to address that issue, we must disentangle substance from
procedure.181 This Article does not address the deep and contentious literature
on the substance of impeachment—those “high Crimes and Misdemeanors”
that may legitimately be described in the articles of impeachment submitted
by the House to the Senate.182 Instead, it focuses on the procedures of
impeachment. Such procedures include the operational mechanisms by which
senators participate in impeachment trials—for example, who oversees the
trial and how it is conducted.183 It is true that we cannot fully disentangle
substance from procedure; the choice of rules in the impeachment context, for
example, impacts the outcome of impeachment trials. But to completely
collapse procedure into substance also goes too far. We can disaggregate the
rules governing impeachment from the substance of impeachment. Hamilton
rightly recognized the “political” nature of impeachment (its substance) and
the ability of senators to resist the “strength of parties” (the procedures).184
Likewise, we can conceive of rules that regulate senators’ conduct during
impeachment trials that allow both political parties—and through them, the
American people those senators represent—to better evaluate the substance of
specific impeachment charges. Specifically, taking a cue from Senators Kaine
and Romney and drawing on scholarship in recent years that has stressed the
importance of oaths, this Article suggests the senatorial impeachment oath as
an avenue through which to promote the integrity of impeachment process.

179. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
180. GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 105. Recall that, in Federalist No. 65, Hamilton reports that the
category of impeachable offenses includes those causing “injuries . . . to the society itself.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
181. See GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 105, 114.
182. See sources cited supra note 71.
183. See GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 33–35.
184. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
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C. The Senatorial Impeachment Oath
The Senatorial Impeachment Oath Clause provides that “[w]hen sitting
for” the purpose of impeachment, the Senate “shall be on Oath or
Affirmation.”185 Other than the rule that convictions require a “[c]oncurrence
of two thirds of the [m]embers present,”186 taking the oath is the only
procedural requirement for impeachment expressly mentioned in the
Constitution.187 That oath instantiates in the Constitution’s text many of the
ideals of impeachment described above.188 In practice, the taking of the oath
marks an important shift, when the oath-taking senator transitions from a
politician to something altogether new.189
The first attempted impeachment of George Turner (a judge in a territorial
supreme court) in 1796 did not reach the Senate because of assurances that
Turner would be prosecuted in territorial courts.190 But perhaps anticipating
future impeachments, the Senate adopted rules for impeachment in February
1798.191 On February 9, 1798, the Senate resolved:
That the oath or affirmation required by the Constitution of
the United States to be administered to the Senate, when
sitting for the trial of impeachment, shall be in the form
following, viz:
“I, A B, solemnly swear, (or affirm, as the case may be,) that
in all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of
____ ____, I will do impartial justice, according to law.”192
The oath was first administered just a few months later in the impeachment
trial of Senator Blount.193
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
187. See BOWMAN, supra note 32.
188. See discussion infra Section II.A.
189. See BLACK, supra note 30, at 10 (noting the “different role” initiated by the oath).
190. See 1 GUIDE TO CONGRESS 394 (CQ Press ed., 6th ed. 2008).
191. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 503 (1798).
192. Id.
193. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2196 (1798) (“After the oath has been administered to the President and
Senate . . . [t]he defendant, William Blount, shall be called to appear and answer the articles of
impeachment exhibited against him.”); see also Vicente, supra note 75, at 133 (“Senator William
Blount has the ignominious distinction of being the first person to face impeachment charges.”).

151

[Vol. 49: 123, 2022]

Impartial Justice:
Restoring Integrity to Impeachment Trials
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

It makes sense to read the oath’s requirement of “do[ing] impartial
justice” in light of Hamilton’s arguments in Federalist No. 65.194 Oath-taking
senators were understood to be setting aside partisan loyalties, loyalties to the
House of Representatives, and even the influence of the “community,” in
deliberating about articles of impeachment.195
Seventy years after it was first adopted, the language of the oath was
amended in preparation for the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson in
1868.196 The oath taken by senators before the 1868 trial, and in every trial
since, reads, “I solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that in all things
appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of _______, now pending, I will
do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws: So help me
God.”197
The changes from the original oath may have increased rhetorical
weight—adding references to the Constitution as well as to God—but those
changes did not clearly impact the practical or legal significance of the oath.
Both versions impose one, and only one, clear obligation on the oath-taker:
doing impartial justice.
Today, senators are administered the oath by the presiding officer (the
Chief Justice, in cases of presidential impeachment) at their desks in the
Senate chamber.198 They then “sign an official oath book, which serves as the
permanent record of the administration of the oath.”199
Given its constitutional basis and the fact that the senatorial impeachment
oath has been a constant feature of impeachment trials since the Founding, it
is surprising how little attention the oath has received from impeachment
scholars.200 Charles Black, for instance, treats it as serving little more than a

Blount’s case was ultimately dismissed by the Senate for lack of jurisdiction. See Vicente, supra note
75, at 134; see also supra text accompanying notes 108–10. For greater discussion of Blount’s
impeachment, see Neumann, supra note 14, at 175–87.
194. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 503 (1798); THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
195. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
196. See S. Res. 479, 99th Cong. (1986); Impeachment Trial of President Andrew Johnson, 1868,
U.S.
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/impeachment/impeachmentjohnson.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2021).
197. S. Res. 479, 99th Cong. (1986).
198. See id.
199. ELIZABETH RYBICKI & MICHAEL GREENE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46185, THE IMPEACHMENT
PROCESS IN THE SENATE 7 (2020).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 30–32.
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symbolic function.201 Neither Neal Katyal and Sam Koppelman nor Cass
Sunstein mention the oath in their recent books about impeachment.202 And
Gerhardt, who has perhaps written more about the impeachment process than
any other scholar, does not mention it in the third edition of his otherwise
exhaustive The Federal Impeachment Process.203 These oversights may be
related to what Richard Re describes as the “underappreciated tradition of
promissory constitutionalism.”204 Re’s call to take oaths “more seriously” is
premised on the fact that others, including those cited above, fail to take oaths
seriously enough.205
The inattention to the impeachment oath is probably even more
pronounced in the general public.206 Those not familiar with the impeachment
process might fail to notice the momentous transition marked by the taking of
the oath.207 As a result, they may expect that senators will retain their political
and partisan allegiances.208 To label the Senate’s proceedings as “trials” is, to
many, little more than mere embellishment of politics as usual.
Despite being long overlooked and underappreciated, the senatorial
impeachment oath is an integral part of the impeachment process. It is also
unique in our constitutional–legal tradition.209 As we will see, the oath blends
features of at least two other common oaths: like the juror’s oath, the
senatorial impeachment oath demands impartiality, and like other oaths for
public office, the senatorial impeachment oath is ostensibly unenforceable.210
In the next Part, I briefly survey those other oaths and introduce a third type
201. See BLACK, supra note 30.
202. See KATYAL & KOPPELMAN, supra note 32; SUNSTEIN, supra note 32.
203. See GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 33–34. Gerhardt skips over the taking of the oath in his
description of the impeachment process in the Senate. Id.
204. See Richard M. Re, Promising the Constitution, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 299, 299 (2016).
205. See id. at 302.
206. See, e.g., Sonam Sheth & Walt Hickey, Most Americans Say They Understand What
Impeachment Is, but Fewer Than a Third Can Actually Define It Correctly, BUS. INSIDER (June 13,
2019, 2:06 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/most-americans-dont-understand-impeachmentpoll-2019-6 (finding that only about “30% of [survey] respondents correctly defined [impeachment]
or its implications,” and concluding that the general public is uninformed about impeachment process
and procedures).
207. See, e.g., Amber Phillips, About That Oath of ‘Impartiality’ Senators Just Took, WASH. POST
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/16/about-that-oath-impartialitysenators-will-take/.
208. See id.
209. See JARED P. COLE & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46013, IMPEACHMENT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 4–5 (2019).
210. See discussion infra Sections III.B, III.C.
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of oath that might offer a model for reforming the impeachment process: the
witness’s oath.
III. OATHS
The senatorial impeachment oath has features like several more common
oaths, and it is possible that the impeachment oath-taking process could be
reformed to resemble others more closely. In this Part, I describe the role of
oaths generally and then examine three specific oaths: (1) juror oaths, (2)
oaths taken for public office, and (3) witness oaths. The oath taken by senators
prior to impeachment trials is supposed to function similar to juror oaths—it
is supposed to ensure that senators are impartial.211 In practice, it functions
much more like oaths taken for public office insofar as it is not (currently)
enforceable.212 In the next Part, I explore avenues to make the impeachment
oath more enforceable—in other words, more like the witness oath.
A. Oaths in American Law
Oaths have ancient roots.213 Helen Silving traces them back to “prereligious, . . . pre-animistic period of culture,” when oaths operated as a “selfcurse, . . . guaranteeing that a promise would be performed.”214 Frederick
Jonassen finds oath-taking, among other places, in Homer’s Iliad, St.
Augustine’s City of God, and early biblical writings.215 Oaths in the American
legal system are thus nothing new.
A bit closer to home, oath-taking bears a “symbiotic relationship” with
the development of the English legal tradition out of which the American legal
system was born.216 In theory, oaths are the basis of constitutional legal
211. See generally S. Res. 479, 99th Cong. (1986).
212. See STEPHEN MICHAEL SHEPPARD, I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF
LEGAL OFFICIALS 6 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 2009).
213. See Patrick O. Gudridge, The Office of the Oath, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 387, 389 (2003);
Frederick B. Jonassen, Kiss the Book . . . You’re President . . . : “So Help Me God” and Kissing the
Book in the Presidential Oath of Office, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 853, 899–906 (2012); Eugene
R. Milhizer, So Help Me Allah: An Historical and Prudential Analysis of Oaths as Applied to the
Current Controversy of the Bible and Quran in Oath Practices in America, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6–15
(2009); Helen Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1330 (1959).
214. Silving, supra note 213.
215. See Jonassen, supra note 213, at 900–02.
216. See M.R.L.L. Kelly, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Oath of Governance: “An
Hieroglyphic of the Laws,” 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 121, 122 (2008).
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authority.217 According to M.R.L.L. Kelly, oaths are the “well-spring of all
power necessary and sufficient to govern.”218 John Locke, who explicitly and
implicitly influenced the shape of the American Constitution, thought that
“[p]romises, covenants, and oaths” were the “bonds of human society.”219
Both the ancient roots of oaths and the role of oaths in shaping Anglo–
American law further justify the focus in this Article on oaths as a remedial
tool for the broken impeachment process.
The Founders thought oaths were sufficiently important to warrant two
mentions in the original Constitution. First, Article II requires the President
to take an oath of office to “faithfully execute the Office of President of the
United States.”220 Second, Article VI of the Constitution (the Supremacy
Clause) requires an oath or affirmation to “support this Constitution” by all
senators, representatives, “Members of the several State Legislatures, and all
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several
States.”221 The Article VI oath requirement is followed by a prohibition
against religious tests as a qualification for public office, suggesting that the
oath was understood as a substitute for obligations stemming from public
officials’ religious commitments.222
The first law passed by Congress enacted the Article VI oath
requirement.223 The oath formulated in the “Act to regulate the Time and

217. See McGinnis, supra note 102, at 655 (“[P]rominence of oaths in the Constitution as well as
the Fifth Amendment shows that the Framers recognized that taking a civil oath was an important
ingredient of the cement that holds a civil society together. Previous societies had depended on
established religions or fixed hierarchies for social cohesion, but the United States was a bold
experiment that depended on the rule of law to protect the rights of each citizen.”).
218. Kelly, supra note 216.
219. JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
212 (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1937).
220. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
221. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
222. See id.; Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1984) (arguing
that “the Framers considered the constitutional oath a substitute for the religious tests the colonists
were familiar with under the English established church”); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH 55 (Princeton Univ. Press ed. 1988) (showing that “some of the ratifiers considered the oath to
be a genuine religious oath”). Steve Sheppard, by contrast, claims that the Founders saw oaths as
creating obligations distinct from religious commitments. See Steve Sheppard, What Oaths Meant to
the Framers’ Generation: A Preliminary Sketch, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 273, 280 (2009).
He claims, as evidence, that “Blackstone saw the Oath as a way of bringing religion to bear in
enforcing an independent obligation, arising from the acceptance of office, not from the oath itself.”
Id.
223. See Act of June 1, 1789, ch. 1, § 1.
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Manner of administering certain Oaths” was simple: “I, A.B. do solemnly
swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the
United States.”224 The law required that the oath be administered to all
members of the First Congress within three days.225
A few years later, Chief Justice John Marshall reiterated the significance
of constitutional oaths in Marbury v. Madison.226 While defending the
Constitution as “paramount law,” Marshall asked rhetorically, “Why
otherwise does [the Constitution] direct the judges to take an oath to support
it?”227 He took almost for granted the significance of oaths to preserving the
Constitution.228 Justice Joseph Story echoed a similar sentiment, promising
that he would “never hesitate to do [his] duty as a [j]udge, under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, . . . be the consequences what they
may.”229 He continued, “That Constitution I have sworn to support, and I
cannot forget or repudiate my solemn obligations at pleasure.”230 And in his
Commentaries on the Constitution, Story recognized the “solemn obligation”
imposed on officials “who feel a deep sense of accountability to a [s]upreme
being.”231
Oaths create, at least, “personal moral obligations” on those who take
them.232 In this sense, they obligate public officials both in their personal
capacities and in their institutional capacities.233 “Institutional obligations,”
which can arise out of oaths of office, compound the “implied moral
expectation that one who accepts a role within an institution will exercise that
role with loyalty to the institution and fidelity to its purposes.”234
More significantly, oaths may create affirmative fiduciary relationships

224. Id.
225. See id.
226. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
227. Id. at 177–78, 180.
228. See id.
229. R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD
REPUBLIC 377 (Univ. of N.C. Press ed. 1986).
230. Id.
231. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 702 (1833).
232. Re, supra note 204; see also Evan D. Bernick, The Morality of the Presidential Oath, 47 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 33, 35 (2021) (arguing “that the [presidential oath of office] imposes a moral obligation
on the President to fulfill a set of legal obligations”).
233. See Re, supra note 204.
234. SHEPPARD, supra note 212, at 168.
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between government officials and the public.235 Richard Re urges scholars to
take oaths “more seriously” as a way to translate the legal demands of the
Constitution into personal moral duties of public officials.236 And Stephen
Sheppard appeals to oaths to argue that “[o]fficials must be moral, not just
legal.”237 For Re and Sheppard, oaths transcend the merely personal, even if
they do not import all the characteristics (especially enforceability) of legal
obligations.238
Not everyone agrees about the obligations imposed by the Constitution.
Michael Seidman, for example, urges his readers to give up the “pernicious
myth” that the Constitution requires obedience to “the commands of people
who died several hundred years ago.”239 On his account, the oath imposes no
obligations on constitutional actors.240 Larry Alexander similarly claims that
“oaths to enforce law” create no obligations when other factors—in
Alexander’s words—“all-things-considered-but-law”—“militate against” law
enforcement.241 But the most extreme position—that oaths do not matter at
all—is rare. Even Seidman concedes that his is a minority position.242
Others argue that certain oaths are illiberal and antidemocratic. Geoffrey
Stone worries that loyalty oaths, such as those that gained notoriety during the
McCarthy Era, stifle speech: “Loyalty oaths reverse the essential relationship
between the citizen and the state in a democratic society. As the framers of
our Constitution understood, the citizens of a self-governing society must be
free to think and talk openly and critically about issues of governance.”243 To

235. See, e.g., Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and
Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2119 (2019) (grounding a fiduciary obligation in the Take Care
and Presidential Oath Clauses).
236. Re, supra note 204, at 302–03; see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 239 (Oxford
Univ. Press ed., 2d ed. 2009) (“[A]n oath may impose a moral obligation to obey (e.g., when
voluntarily undertaken prior to assuming an office of state which one is under no compulsion or great
pressure to assume).”).
237. SHEPPARD, supra note 212, at xv.
238. See Re, supra note 204, at 304; SHEPPARD, supra note 212, at 107.
239. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 9 (2012).
240. See id. at 10.
241. LARRY ALEXANDER, WAS DWORKIN AN ORIGINALIST? 14, 15 n.31 (Oxford Univ. Press ed.
2015); see also David Lyons, Justification and Judicial Responsibility, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 178, 192
(1984) (considering some of the limits on judges’ obligations “of fidelity to law”).
242. See SEIDMAN, supra note 239, at 139 (“[A]s things stand now, there is minimal political
support for constitutional skepticism.”).
243. Geoffrey R. Stone, Loyalty Oaths Fail the Test of Democracy, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2008,
7:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-mar-11-oe-stone11-story.html. But see
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the extent that oaths generally curb citizens’ abilities to exercise constitutional
freedoms, it is true that they limit constitutionally provided freedoms.244 That
was especially true when coupled with the social pressures accompanying
such oaths taken during the McCarthy Era.245 But Stone’s concern should not
be overstated; not all oaths threaten democratic freedoms. Constitutional
oaths, in particular, are supposed to limit the sorts of behaviors by
government—abuses of power, governmental overreach, and arbitrary
control, to name a few—that have presented the gravest threat to citizens’
freedoms throughout history.246 Insofar as those oaths require loyalty to the
Constitution, Stone’s concerns are misplaced. (Again, Stone had in mind the
more pernicious, non-constitutional loyalty oaths of the McCarthy Era.)247
Notwithstanding any concerns that have been raised about the power and
desirability of oaths, the fact is that they do play a role in American
constitutionalism. Whether specifically derived from the text of the
Constitution or found more generally within our constitutional history and
tradition, oaths permeate American law. The following examples reveal some
of oaths’ diverse features.
B. Juror Oaths: Impartiality
First, the juror’s oath binds the oath-taker to impartiality.248 Jurors are
obligated to set aside their biases and prejudices for the purpose of considering
evidence presented in the courtroom.249 One of legal cinema’s classics, 12
Angry Men is about a jury wrestling to decide the fate of a man accused of
killing his father.250 Juror #8 (played by Henry Fonda) spends the duration of
the movie persuading the rest of the jurors that their initial reactions to the
evidence presented by the prosecution are wrong.251 Though not often thought
John Kness, The Long History of ‘Loyalty Oaths,’ L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2008, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-oew-kness2apr02-story.html (challenging Stone’s account of the
role of oaths in American history and law).
244. See Stone, supra note 243.
245. See id.
246. See discussion infra Section III.C.
247. See Stone, supra note 243.
248. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 (1984).
249. See id. (recognizing the obligation of an oath-taking juror to “set aside any opinion he might
hold and decide the case on the evidence”).
250. See 12 ANGRY MEN (Orion-Nova Productions 1957).
251. See id. (portraying jurors considering evidence and elements of the law, including burden of
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of as such, the movie is as much about those jurors’ quests to live up to the
obligations of their oaths as it is about their efforts to decide the particular
case before them.252 Juror #8’s efforts to whittle away at the prejudices of his
fellow jurors solidified his legacy as a hero in the American legal mind.253
Unlike other oaths, the juror’s oath has resisted standardization.254 At the
federal level and in many states, juror oaths are “simply an old tradition judges
have made up.”255 Especially in jurisdictions where oaths are not required by
law, it can be difficult to evaluate jurors’ oaths because they are frequently
not even transcribed by court reporters.256 In those states that do standardize
juror oaths, there is some variance in oath language, but oaths almost all
include appeals to God and promises to deliver a “true” verdict.257 Consider,
for example, Pennsylvania’s oath: “You do solemnly swear by [a]lmighty God
. . . that you will well and truly try the issue.”258
Juror oaths are not mentioned in the Constitution, but oath-taking may
nonetheless be required by the Constitution’s promise of an “impartial
jury.”259 As the Supreme Court emphasized in Lockhart v. McCree, the

proof, to reach a decision).
252. See id.
253. See Austin Sarat, Fathers in Law: Violence and Reason in 12 Angry Men, 82 CHI. KENT L.
REV. 863, 864 (2007) (describing how “heroic Juror #8 . . . earns the admiration of the film’s imagined
audience by . . . unquestioningly adhering to law’s existing rules and conventions and submitting to
the image of the good judge as one who separates public and private, reason from emotion”).
254. See generally Kathleen M. Knudsen, The Juror’s Sacred Oath: Is There a Constitutional Right
to a Properly Sworn Jury?, 32 TOURO L. REV. 489, 495–500 (2016) (describing some of the variation
among state and federal courts in the administration of juror oaths).
255. James Joseph Duane, Jury Nullification: The Top Secret Constitutional Right, 22 LITIG. 6, 12
(1996).
256. See CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 239 (1998).
257. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278 § 4 (2020) (“You shall well and truly try the issue . . . so
help you God.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.28 (West 2005) (“Do you swear or affirm that you
will diligently inquire into and carefully deliberate all matters between the State of Ohio and the
defendant (giving the defendant’s name)? Do you swear or affirm you will do this to the best of your
skill and understanding, without bias or prejudice? So help you God.”); 234 PA. CODE § 640 (2021)
(“You do solemnly swear by [a]lmighty God . . . that you will well and truly try the issue . . . .”); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.22 (West 2021) (“You and each of you do solemnly swear that in the
case . . . you will a true verdict render according to the law and the evidence, so help you God.”).
California is an example of a state not affirmatively requiring any appeal to God. See CAL. CIV. PRO.
CODE § 232(b) (West 2019) (“Do you and each of you understand and agree that you will well and
truly try the cause now pending before this court, and a true verdict render according only to the
evidence presented to you and to the instructions of the court.”).
258. 234 PA. CODE § 640 (2021).
259. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Knudsen, supra note 254, at 490–91. Juror oath-taking serves
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impartiality of a jury is premised on jurors having taken an oath to
“conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to
the facts of the particular case.”260 A few years after Lockhart, Justice
Kennedy observed that “[a] juror who allows racial or gender bias to influence
assessment of the case breaches the compact and renounces his or her oath.”261
Insofar as it promotes juror impartiality, the juror’s oath functions like
many other rules regulating juries: the fair cross-section requirement;262 the
standard for evaluating for-cause removals;263 the ability of defendants to
request a change of venue;264 and more.265 Justice Cardozo, in stressing the
importance of the voir dire process, observed that a juror whose “answers to
the questions [in voir dire] are willfully evasive or knowingly untrue, the
talesman, when accepted, is a juror in name only. His relation to the court and
to the parties is tainted in its origin; it is a mere pretense and sham.”266 On
Justice Cardozo’s account, the oath enforces the impartiality function of voir
dire.267
The Supreme Court recently expanded the impartiality requirement from
a procedural safeguard to a substantive protection.268 Like other rules
regulating the jury, impartiality was long treated as procedural; all that was

other functions in the criminal justice process as well: it is only after the jury is empaneled and sworn
that jeopardy attaches. See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737–38 (1963).
260. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986).
261. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 153 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
262. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (“[T]he presence of a fair cross-section of
the community on venires, panels, of lists from which petit juries are drawn is essential to the
fulfillment of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury trial in criminal prosecutions.”).
263. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (holding that “the proper standard for
determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause . . . is whether the juror’s views
would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath’” (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980))).
264. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure establish that the
defendant may move to transfer his or her trial to another district because of “prejudice against the
defendant . . . in the transferring district [such] that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial
trial there.” Id.
265. See Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377, 382 (1956) (holding that evidence of “extraneous
influences” that disturb a juror and restrict the juror’s ability to freely decide a case can constitute
grounds for a new trial).
266. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 11 (1933).
267. See id. at 11–12 (discussing how sworn jurors are restrained by their role and therefore must
be impartial rather than partisan).
268. See Richard Lorren Jolly, The New Impartial Jury Mandate, 117 MICH. L. REV. 713, 713
(2019).
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required was “certain prophylactic procedures that secure a jury that is more
likely to reach verdicts impartially.”269 But in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado,
the Court held that evidence of extreme bias by a juror could justify
postconviction relief.270 Specifically, “where a juror makes a clear statement
that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a
criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment . . . permit[s] the trial court to
consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the
[impartiality] guarantee.”271 Impartiality is thus, at least sometimes, a
substantive guarantee.
The Peña-Rodriguez Court observed that violations of substantive
impartiality should be rare: “Jurors are presumed to follow their oath[s].”272
The examples presented in Part II suggest such a presumption is not
necessarily warranted with respect to senators preparing for, or engaging in,
impeachment trials.
C. Oaths for Public Office: Unenforceability
The second example of oaths, already mentioned in several places above,
are those taken for public office.273 All public officeholders—whether elected
or appointed, federal or state—are required to take an oath.274 Even civil
service officers must take oaths.275 Consider the oaths taken by the three main
groups of federal officeholders.
1. The President. The President’s oath is the only one expressly presented
in the Constitution.276 Article II requires that, before entering office, the
President take the following oath: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the
best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States.”277 That oath is the lynchpin in recent arguments for constraining the

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id.
See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
See discussion supra Sections II.C, III.A.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
See 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2018).
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
Id.
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power and authority of presidents.278 Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib, and Jed
Shugerman, for example, argue that the Presidential Oath Clause obligates the
Executive to faithfully execute the law.279 And Evan Bernick claims that the
Presidential Oath Clause proscribes the President from enforcing
unconstitutional laws: “[I]f the President were obliged by the Take Care
Clause to take care that unconstitutional statutes be executed, he would
arguably be obliged to violate the Presidential Oath Clause as well as the
Supremacy Clause.”280
2. Congresspeople. All congresspeople, before assuming office, must
take an oath to “support and defend the Constitution.”281 As formerRepresentative Vic Snyder observes about that “special” oath, congresspeople
will not get paid until they take it.282 Like the President’s oath, the
congressional oath has been used to argue for limits on congressional
power.283 Like Bernick in the executive context, Anant Raut and J. Benjamin

278. See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty To Disregard Unconstitutional
Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1631–33 (2008) (appealing to the Faithful Execution Clause, Supremacy
Clause, and Presidential Oath Clause to implicitly prohibit the President from executing
unconstitutional laws); Kent et al., supra note 235, at 2119 (describing the Faithful Execution and
Presidential Oath Clauses as “substantial textual and historical commitments to what we would today
call fiduciary obligations of the President”); Evan D. Bernick, Faithful Execution: Where
Administrative Law Meets the Constitution, 108 GEO. L.J. 1, 33 (2019) (arguing that the Presidential
Oath Clause, Take Care Clause, and Supremacy Clause require the President to follow the
“Constitution rather than . . . unconstitutional statutes”); MATTHEW A. PAULEY, I DO SOLEMNLY
SWEAR THE PRESIDENT’S CONSTITUTIONAL OATH: ITS MEANING AND IMPORTANCE IN THE HISTORY
OF OATHS 243 (1999) (“The prescribed oath can be . . . a vital restraint on our [p]residents. . . . It is a
self-restraint, to be sure, but a restraint certainly as important as impeachment or the threat of electoral
defeat.”).
279. See Kent et al., supra note 235, at 2113.
280. Bernick, supra note 278 (footnote omitted).
281. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2018).
282. See Vic Snyder, You’ve Taken an Oath To Support the Constitution, Now What? The
Constitutional Requirement for a Congressional Oath of Office, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
897, 897–98 (2001). Several other congresspeople responded to Representative Snyder’s article
similarly reflecting on the importance of the congressional oath. See generally Dale Bumpers, Bob
Filner, J. Dennis Hastert, Blanche Lambert Lincoln & David E. Price, The Congressional Oath of
Office: Responses to Congressman Vic Snyder, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 803, 803–816 (2002)
(responses by Senator Dale Bumpers, Representative Bob Filner, Speaker of the House J. Dennis
Hastert, Senator Blanche Lambert Lincoln, and Representative David E. Price). Senator Russ
Feingold argues that the oath should influence legislators’ votes on specific issues, such as campaign
finance and laws affecting constitutional rights. See Russ Feingold, Upholding an Oath to the
Constitution: A Legislator's Responsibilities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006).
283. See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, Jurisdiction Stripping in Three Acts: A Three String Serenade,
51 VILL. L. REV. 593, 635 n.178 (2006) (noting that “the congressional oath requires that members
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Schrader argue that the oath obligates representatives and senators “not to vote
for legislation they believe to be unconstitutional.”284 Their argument accords
with the constitutional mandate that “[s]enators and [r]epresentatives . . . shall
be bound by [o]ath or [a]ffirmation, to support th[e] Constitution.”285
Meanwhile, Quinta Jurecic claims that the legislators’ oath obligated House
members to open an impeachment inquiry into President Trump after
publication of the Mueller Report.286 Though admitting that the oath did not
create a “justiciable obligation,” Jurecic argues that the congressional “oath
imposes some basic level of constitutional responsibility in certain
circumstances.”287 Jurecic’s position seemingly accords with Justice
Rehnquist’s claim in Cole v. Richardson that constitutional oaths “assure that
those in positions of public trust [are] willing to commit themselves to live by
the constitutional processes of our system.”288
3. Federal Judges. Finally, the full oath required to be taken by all federal
judges is as follows:
I, _______ _______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will administer justice without respect to persons, and do
equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will
faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the
duties incumbent upon me as _______ under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me
God.289
Judge Diane Wood and others root judicial obligations of impartiality in the
judge’s oath290: “The term ‘. . . persons’ in that oath means exactly what it
uphold the Constitution”).
284. Anant Raut & J. Benjamin Schrader, Dereliction of Duty: When Members of Congress Vote
for Laws They Believe To Be Unconstitutional, 10 CUNY L. REV. 511, 511 (2007) (emphasis added).
285. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
286. See Quinta Jurecic, Impeachment Proceedings and the Congressional Oath, LAWFARE (July
29, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/impeachment-proceedings-and-congressionaloath.
287. Id.
288. Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 684 (1972).
289. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2018).
290. See Diane P. Wood, Reflections on the Judicial Oath, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 177, 186 (2005);
William H. Pryor Jr., The Religious Faith and Judicial Duty of an American Catholic Judge, 24 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 352 (2006) (“As a judge in a government of laws, not men, I have a special
moral duty to obey and enforce the law in accordance with my oath.”).
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says: all human beings, regardless of race, sex, citizenship, age, disability,
belief system, or wealth. All these persons are entitled to impartial, dignified
consideration of their cases before the courts.”291
Chief Justice Earl Warren likewise recognized that he was “oath-bound
to defend the Constitution.”292 And recall Chief Justice John Marshall’s
assertion in Marbury that the “oath certainly applies” to judges’ “conduct in
their official character”: “How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to
be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what
they swear to support?”293
The judge’s oath has garnered special attention in recent years from
originalist scholars. Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick, for example, argue that
the oath obligates judges to faithfully respect the “fixed communicative
content of the Constitution’s text.”294 The fact that judges voluntarily assume
their positions is key for Barnett and Bernick.295 Once they voluntarily take
the oath, judges become obligated “morally and legally to ascertain and
‘faithfully’ give effect to the Constitution’s original meaning.”296
The various oaths taken for public office—only briefly sketched above—
are united by one common feature: unenforceability.297 Oaths for public office
are practically symbolic because there are no obvious ways to enforce them
in the law.298 Officeholders may be removed from office through elections or
impeachment, but removal through those means has rarely—if ever—been

291. Wood, supra note 290.
292. PAULEY, supra note 278, at 189.
293. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
294. Barnett & Bernick, supra note 42, at 25; see also Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”:
Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607,
1674 (2009) (“Those who swear the Article VI oath should therefore be textualist semi-originalists
who take the historic textually expressed sense as interpretively paramount.”).
295. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 42, at 24 (“Once officials do [take the oath,] they are
entrusted with power that they would not otherwise possess, a power that has moral implications.”).
296. Id. at 26. Though Barnett and Bernick assert a legal obligation of judges, they concede that
the obligation is practically unenforceable. See id. at 24 n.115, 26.
297. See James S. Bowman & Jonathan P. West, Pointless or Powerful: The Case for Oaths of
Office, RESEARCHGATE (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337594072_
Pointless_or_Powerful_The_Case_for_Oaths_of_Office (describing oaths of office as “not selfenforcing” and dependent on “voluntary adherence”).
298. See Allan W. Vestal, Regarding Oaths of Office, 37 PACE L. REV. 292, 311 (2016) (discussing
the symbolic role of oaths of office and how they should be a kind of ritual where officers “pledge
themselves to a common set of principles, beliefs, or values”).
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expressly premised on oath-breaking.299 It is for that reason that Matthew
Pauley describes the President’s oath as only a “self-restraint,”300 and Edward
Dumbauld characterizes it as “a ceremonial formality.”301
Perhaps the unenforceability of these oaths is a good thing.
Representative Snyder worries that enforcement of oaths might produce a
“caustic” environment in which accusations of “disloyalty” would be used to
target political opponents.302 Snyder may be right: colonial–American loyalty
oaths were often enforced “by social ostracism, economic pressure, and
physical terrorism”303—none of which are desirable features of a wellfunctioning legal system.
There are other potentially undesirable consequences of enforcing oaths
as well. Consider the instability that would accompany transitions of power
if there was disagreement about the obligations imposed by constitutional
oaths: a “new [p]resident [might] have to decide whether to undertake
enforcement actions against those members of prior administrations whose
actions, in the view of the new administration, violated the Constitution or
laws of the United States.”304 Political instability, like ostracism and
terrorism, is undesirable.
In summary, whether for good or for ill, oaths for public office—such as
those taken by presidents, members of Congress, and judges—are practically
unenforceable in their current form.
D. Witness Oaths: A Model of Enforceability
The third and perhaps the most well-known example of an oath—
portrayed in movies and on television shows such as Law & Order—is that
taken by witnesses in court. The Federal Rules of Evidence require only that
a witness give an oath to “testify truthfully” in a manner “designed to impress
299. See SHEPPARD, supra note 212, at 6 (“The most significant remedy [for breaking moral
obligations] is for those aware of moral breaches by an official to interfere with the advancement or
reappointment of that official. . . . This is the moral basis for the exercise of the vote by the people
governed by officials.”).
300. PAULEY, supra note 278.
301. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 275 (1964).
302. Snyder, supra note 282, at 923.
303. HAROLD M. HYMAN, TO TRY MEN’S SOULS: LOYALTY TESTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 65
(1959).
304. Paul Horwitz, Honor’s Constitutional Moment: The Oath and Presidential Transitions, 103
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 259, 265 (2008).
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that duty on the witness’s conscience.”305 Thus, as with juror oaths, there is
no standard language for the oaths taken by witnesses.306 The language most
familiar to the American public is something like the following: “You do
affirm that all the testimony you are about to give in the case now before the
court will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; this you do
affirm under the pains and penalties of perjury?”307
Like the juror’s oath, the witness’s oath obligates the witness to adhere to
a standard of “truth.”308 But as a practical matter, the witness’s standard is
more stringent because witnesses give testimony or present evidence; they
make positive assertions that may be objectively evaluated for their truth
content. Jurors, by contrast, are truthful only passively.309 Additionally, while
the truth content of a witness’s testimony may be evaluated independently,
the truth content of an individual juror’s verdict is filtered through the
collective jury, rendering an individual juror’s honesty more difficult to
evaluate.310
The witness’s oath is also unique because of its straightforward
enforceability, a feature that distinguishes the witness’s oath from oaths for
public office. The giving of false testimony, as evidenced in Blackstone’s
Commentaries, was a common law misdemeanor punishable by up to six
months imprisonment.311 Today, federal perjury laws criminalize willfully (in
the case of 18 U.S.C. § 1621) or knowingly (in the case of 18 U.S.C. § 1623)
305. FED. R. EVID. 603.
306. See United States v. Mensah, 737 F.3d 789, 806 (1st Cir. 2013) (stating that whether an oath
has been given is “a question of substance rather than form”).
307. Brendan Koerner, Where Did We Get Our Oath?: The Origin of the Truth, the Whole Truth,
and Nothing but the Truth, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2004, 5:52 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2004/04/how-the-courtroom-got-its-oath.html.
308. See FED. R. EVID. 603.
309. Under early English common law, juror oaths were enforceable through a writ of attaint and
jurors could be punished for delivering false verdicts. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*402. Today, no such writ or analogous legal device is available except in cases of extraordinary
behavior by jurors. See Dialogue on the American Jury, Part I: The History of Trial by Jury, AM.
BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/public_education/
resources/dialoguepart1.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2021) (noting that writs of attaint
were abolished in 1825).
310. See Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene, Jury Decision Making: Implications for and from
Psychology, ASS’N FOR PSYCH. SCI., https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/
Jury-Decision-Making.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2021) (explaining how “actual verdicts are obviously
a function of group processes” and “little [is known] about how individual [juror] preferences are
translated into a group decision”).
311. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *137.
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giving false testimony or presenting false evidence where an oath has been
properly administered.312 The Supreme Court has lauded such laws for
keeping “justice free from the pollution of perjury”313 because “[p]erjured
testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concepts of judicial
proceedings.”314 Oath-taking is a legally essential element of the crime of
perjury.315
Again, the three examples of oaths described in this Part are not
exhaustive.316 Rather, they serve to illustrate different features of American
legal oaths upon which we may draw support in considering potential reforms
to the impeachment process.317
IV. REFORMING THE SENATORIAL IMPEACHMENT OATH
Since at least as far back as 1798, the Senate has understood the
constitutional impeachment oath requirement to obligate senators sitting for
impeachment trials to “do impartial justice.”318 As Part III demonstrates, that
oath has characteristics of several other oaths. For one thing, the impartiality
requirement—literally, “do impartial justice”—resembles the impartiality
requirement of the juror’s oath.319 That is why it is so straightforward to think
about the Senate trial as a unique type of jury trial.320 Hamilton emphasizes
the jury-like function that senators would be called on to play in impeachment
trials. In Federalist No. 65, he describes the “necessary impartiality” of
senators, who would, like a jury, decide the conflict “between an [individual]
accused, and the [representatives of the people, his accusers].”321
At the same time, to the extent that violations of the impeachment oath
are not clearly enforceable, the senatorial impeachment oath resembles oaths

312. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623 (2018).
313. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 68 (1951).
314. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976).
315. See United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953). Debrow makes clear that the oath
must only have been “authorized by a law of the United States.” Id. at 377.
316. See, e.g., Federal Judicial Center, Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges 265–70 (6th ed.
2013) (listing various oaths).
317. See supra text accompanying notes 211–12.
318. See supra Part II.C.
319. See discussion supra Section III.B.
320. See Turley, supra note 14, at 3–4 (discussing the Senate trial as being a “unique forum”).
321. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).

167

[Vol. 49: 123, 2022]

Impartial Justice:
Restoring Integrity to Impeachment Trials
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

taken for public office.322 The lack of enforceability can be seen, for example,
in the fact that an impeached public official cannot challenge his or her
conviction on grounds of impartiality.323 More generally, oath-breaking does
not subject senators to any form of prosecutorial scrutiny.324
Despite the apparent unenforceability of the senatorial impeachment oath,
one wonders whether the integrity of the impeachment process can be
improved by reforming that oath. The easiest approach would be to draw
greater public attention to the obligation it imposes.325 During the first
impeachment of President Trump, for example, a group of lawyers filed an
open letter to the Senate urging senators to “do impartial justice.”326 Even just
raising public awareness about the oath, as the group sought to do, might
generate greater accountability by senators.327
More significantly, as I propose here, the senatorial impeachment oath
could be rendered enforceable (1) by passage of a perjury-like impeachment
law328 or (2) by the Senate itself, through changes to its standing rules.329 Both
proposals would target senators who violate their oaths. Though such changes
are politically infeasible—the Senate seems unlikely to endorse narrowing the
power of senators during impeachment—neither is entirely unrealistic. Many
other Senate rules and laws already target bad behavior by elected officials,

322. See discussion supra Section III.C.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 273–80.
324. See discussion supra Section III.C.
325. Cf. Julie Beck, What Good Is ‘Raising Awareness?,’ ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/04/what-good-is-raising-awareness/391002/
(“Awareness can be a first step toward changing behavior.”).
326. See Staci Zaretsky, All Rise: Hundreds of Lawyers Protest on Steps of Supreme Court To
Demand ‘Impartial Justice’ in Trump’s Impeachment, ABOVE THE LAW (Jan. 31, 2020, 11:43 AM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/all-rise-hundreds-of-lawyers-protest-on-steps-of-supreme-court-todemand-impartial-justice-in-trumps-impeachment/.
327. See Daniel Schuman & Zach Graves, To Make Congress More Accountable, Make It More
Open, HILL (Apr. 3, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/202358-tomake-congress-more-accountable-make-it-more-open (“Bringing the lawmaking process out into the
light of day serves to level the playing field with entrenched special interests, who otherwise benefit
from privileged access and a more opaque process.”).
328. Michael Gerhardt considers other possible statutory and constitutional amendments to the
impeachment process, including to require automatic suspension, removal, or disqualification of
federal judges convicted of felonies and to shift fact-finding responsibilities away from the Senate.
See GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 161–73.
329. See RYBICKI & GREENE, supra note 199, at 2–3 (discussing changes the Senate has made to
the rules).
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including for election-related crimes,330 bribery,331 and receipt of illegal
gratuities.332 Moreover, as evidenced by the long history of perjury
prosecutions, oaths are regularly enforced.333 The fact that the senatorial
impeachment oath is not yet enforced is a privilege extended to senators;
having been abused, it is time to consider removing that privilege.
A perjury-like law would allow for the prosecution of oath-breaking
senators and would perhaps be the most effective means of enforcing the
senatorial impeachment oath. But such a law raises constitutional questions
and might hinder impeachment trials. A more manageable proposal would be
to reform the senate’s impeachment rules.334 Rule changes would not likely
raise constitutional concerns and could still render the impeachment oath
enforceable. Though rules are weaker than laws because rules allow only selfpolicing within the Senate, changes to the Senate impeachment rules could
still be better than the status quo.
The viability of either proposal is partly a function of how Democrats and
Republicans understand the political risks of enforcement.335 But as
demonstrated in Part II, the three most recent presidential impeachment trials
featured oath-breaking by senators of both parties.336 One model for the type
of political neutrality necessary to enact either proposal is John Rawls’s veil
of ignorance.337 Rawls develops his theory of justice by hypothesizing about
the political system that would be developed by “free and equal persons”
stripped of identifying information such as race, ethnicity, gender, and
330. See generally ELECTION CRIMES BRANCH - U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF
ELECTION OFFENSES 2–5 (Richard C. Pilger ed., 8th ed. 2017).
331. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2018) (federal bribery statute).
332. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2018) (federal gratuities statute).
333. See, e.g., Michael D. Gordon, The Invention of a Common Law Crime: Perjury and the
Elizabethan Courts, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 145, 145–70 (1980) (exploring the history of the English
Perjury Statute of 1563 and demonstrating that oaths have been enforced regularly throughout history);
Silving, supra note 213, at 1381–90 (tracing the concept of perjury through history from “biblical law”
to the modern, common law).
334. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
335. See GERHARDT, supra note 32, at xiii (discussing how Congress members’ undertaking of
political risks may impact the future of the federal impeachment process).
336. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
337. See RAWLS, supra note 57, at 15, 86–87. Sunstein similarly appeals to such a model in his
most recent book about impeachment. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 14–15 (“Try to put yourself
behind a veil of ignorance, in which you know nothing about the president and his policies. You have
no idea whether he would win your vote or your support. All you know about are the actions that are
said to be a basis for impeachment. If that is all you know, would you think that he should be
impeached?”).
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perhaps political allegiances.338 (Rawls does not list partisanship among such
traits, but it is at least compatible with how he envisions the veil.) If
Democratic and Republican political leaders stand behind a veil of ignorance
and weigh the options described below, those leaders will be able to better
realize the ideals of impeachment envisioned in the Constitution.
A. Defining Impartiality
Before turning to either proposal, it will be helpful to define oath-breaking
more clearly. What does it mean for a senator to be influenced by his or her
party? How do we know when a senator has ceased to be impartial? Unlike
perjury, in which the veracity of a witness’s statements may be measured
against real-world facts, impartiality is not so easily measured against an
objective standard.339 Both reform proposals—a perjury-like law and changes
to Senate rules—require a workable definition of “impartiality.”340
Concerns about defining “impartiality” are serious but not
insurmountable. We regularly identify impartiality in other contexts. In Irvin
v. Dowd, for example, the Court considered whether a juror had formed a
“positive and decided opinion” about the case, ruling that those citizens with
such opinions should be kept off juries.341 According to the Court, the proper
inquiry is “whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed [by the
juror] are such as in law necessarily . . . raise the presumption of partiality.”342
As with jurors, expressed opinions by Senators that suggest those Senators
have already decided whether to convict or acquit before a trial would almost
certainly call into question their impartiality.

338. See RAWLS, supra note 57, at 15, 86–87. Rawls writes that “[i]n the original position [from
which he calls upon them to theorize a just political order], the parties are not allowed to know the
social positions or the particular comprehensive doctrines of the persons they represent. They also do
not know persons’ race and ethnic group, sex, or various native endowments such as strength and
intelligence, all within the normal range.” Id. at 15.
339. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724–25 (1961) (“Impartiality is not a technical conception.
It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the
Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial
formula.” (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145–46 (1936))).
340. See, e.g., Kevin Graff, To Be “Impartial” Must a Juror Reject His Own Life Experiences?, 54
UIC J. MARSHALL L. REV. 627, 632 (2021) (“The definition of impartiality ‘is not a static concept[]
but can be defined only in relation to specific facts and circumstances.’” (quoting Farese v. United
States, 428 F.2d 178, 179 (5th Cir. 1970))).
341. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723.
342. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878)).
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Impartiality, in the context of impeachment, can also be understood by
what it lacks: prejudices and biases.343 We might envision impartiality along
a spectrum and focus our attention on the most brazen violations of that norm.
At one extreme, when senators expressly indicate their biases before or during
impeachment trials and indicate that their votes are functional on their partisan
loyalties, they clearly violate rules of impartiality. Such behavior raises real
questions about the abilities of those senators to “do impartial justice.”344 The
other extreme—pure impartiality—exists only in theory. Imagine a
hypothetical case in which, either by death or resignation, a Senate seat is
vacant in the weeks before an impeachment trial.345 At the very last minute,
the seat is filled by an otherwise eligible senator who has no political
background, partisan identification, or even knowledge of the facts
surrounding the pending impeachment matter. Even if such a senator might
make a poor congressperson generally, she would make a great juror in the
impeachment trial.346 The freshly appointed senator would embody the ideal
of “impartial justice” that Hamilton envisioned.
Most impeachment trials will feature hard cases—those that lie along the
spectrum between these two extremes.347 Whether senators’ statements and
behavior imply unacceptable biases will not always be clear.348 No senators
will fit the hypothetical model of pure impartiality sketched above.349 And
343. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 869 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 2014) (defining
“impartial” as “[n]ot favoring one side more than another; unbiased and disinterested; unswayed by
personal interest”).
344. See Holman et al., supra note 131 (“Senators may enter the trial with predetermined views, but
if they are to uphold their oaths, they cannot enter the trial with a locked-in conclusion based on
partisanship, personal allegiance or political calculations.”).
345. See Zachary D. Clopton & Steven E. Art, The Meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment and a
Century of State Defiance, 107 NW. L. REV. 1181, 1187 (2013) (“[T]he Seventeenth Amendment
requires states to hold elections each time a seat becomes vacant. State legislatures may give
governors permission to fill vacancies temporarily, but the people ultimately must elect a new
senator.”).
346. See Graff, supra note 340, at 632–33 (“A fair trial is generally interpreted as being conducted
before unprejudiced jurors who are instructed by the judge as to the law and facts.”).
347. See, e.g., Totenberg, supra note 154 (“[Republican Senator] Lott and [Democratic Senator]
Daschle sought to preserve the notion of neutrality at the trial and tried to separate themselves from
the White House.”).
348. See Graff, supra note 340, at 634 n.60 (“We have no psychic calibers with which to measure
the purity of the prospective juror; rather, our mundane experience must guide us to the impartial jury
promised by the Sixth Amendment.” (quoting United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1230 (5th Cir.
1976))).
349. See, e.g., id. at 628 (“[I]t is not possible for a court to erase the minds of each juror prior to
trial or to instruct a juror to disregard their own life experiences.”).
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when the subject of impeachment is the President, almost all senators will
have preexisting professional, if not also personal, relationships with that
President.350 But hard cases are nothing new in the American legal system.351
Such cases require reasoned judgment.
Of course, not all biases or prejudices are problematic for the purpose of
impeachment.352 Meiring de Villiers draws a line between general and
specific juror biases, only the latter of which are constitutionally proscribed.353
General biases result from a person’s background, including race, gender,
religion, education, and more; those biases “exist independently of any
specific knowledge of the case.”354 By contrast, specific biases—especially
preconceived opinions about the outcome of a case—“violate the impartiality
doctrine.”355 When senators import preconceived opinions about the validity
of an impeachment, rather than weigh the evidence presented at the trial, those
senators violate their impartiality oaths.356 By tailoring impartiality in the
impeachment context to focus primarily on the importation of preconceptions
into impeachment trials, we avoid the need to assess other, contestable aspects
of those trials.357 The narrow focus on specific biases (especially those
derived from party loyalties) enables us to target most accurately the behavior
Hamilton derided in Federalist No. 65.
350. See, e.g., Sean Sullivan & Seung Min Kim, Trump and McConnell, Once Adversaries, Have
Realized
They
Need
Each
Other,
WASH.
POST
(May
22,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-and-mcconnell-once-adversaries-have-realizedthey-need-one-another/2018/05/22/3a9aafb2-5aac-11e8-b656-a5f8c2a9295d_story.html (discussing
President Trump and Senator McConnell’s alliance and relationship formed well before President
Trump’s impeachment trial).
351. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975); Daniel Statman, Hard
Cases and Moral Dilemmas, 15 L. & PHIL. 117 (1996).
352. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 102, at 657 (claiming that senators must use political judgment
in the impeachment process, which necessarily involves some bias or prejudice).
353. See Meiring de Villiers, The Impartiality Doctrine: Constitutional Meaning and Judicial
Impact, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 71, 81–82 (2010).
354. Id. at 72, 82; see also James J. Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 269, 271 (1988) (“[A]ll adults have beliefs, values, and prejudices which make
impartiality in the tabula rasa sense impossible.”).
355. De Villiers, supra note 353, at 72–73.
356. See Holman et al., supra note 131 (claiming impartiality can only be achieved when “the trial
is structured to air and evaluate all relevant evidence, without built-in favor for or prejudice against
the president or impeached official”).
357. See, e.g., Bob Bauer, The Trump Impeachment and the Question of Precedent, LAWFARE (Jan.
16, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-impeachment-and-question-precedent
(discussing the potential of a toxic precedent the House’s impeachment of President Trump could
establish).
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Additionally, some aspects of “impartiality” are untenable in the context
of impeachment trials. For example, although the impartiality of venire panels
from which juries are drawn requires that potential jurors represent a fair
cross-section of their communities,358 the preselected nature of the Senate
“jury” precludes such demographic representativeness for impeachment
trials.359 As a result, Senate impeachments will be conducted by a “jury” of
old (64.3 years), white (88%) men (76%).360 Likewise, we cannot expect the
publicity of an impeachment trial to justify different treatment for the
impeached party. In the federal criminal law context, publicity of an alleged
crime is among the factors courts consider in evaluating requests for venue
transfers.361 By contrast, publicity is a hallmark of most impeachments—
especially those of presidents—and the partiality concerns that publicity raises
cannot be redressed through any constitutional mechanism. In short, to
combat the partiality concerns raised by the unrepresentativeness of the
Senate and the regular publicity of impeachment trials, we can rely only on
the dignity and independence that Hamilton promised.362 Those unresolvable
defects amplify the importance of safeguarding the impartiality of the Senate
during impeachment trials where possible; where specific biases can be
checked, they should be.363
358. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (ruling that “the presence of a fair cross[]section of the community on venires, panels, of lists from which petit juries are drawn is essential to
the fulfillment of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury trial in criminal
prosecutions”).
359. See Katherine Schaeffer, Racial, Ethnic Diversity Increases Yet Again with the 117th
Congress,
PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Jan.
28,
2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2021/01/28/racial-ethnic-diversity-increases-yet-again-with-the-117th-congress/
(“Although
recent Congresses have continued to set new highs for racial and ethnic diversity, they have still been
disproportionately [w]hite when compared with the overall U.S. population.”).
360. JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45583, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 116TH CONGRESS:
A PROFILE (2020).
361. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 21 (providing for venue transfer under certain circumstances, including
“prejudice against the defendant exist[ing] in the transferring district”). In Skilling v. United States,
addressing the securities fraud prosecution of the former-CEO of Enron, the Supreme Court provided
a set of factors to consider in evaluating change of venue motions: (1) “the size and characteristics of
the community in which the crime occurred”; (2) whether news stories about the crime contained any
“blatantly prejudicial information of the type readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to
shut from sight”; (3) how much time had elapsed between the alleged crime and the trial; and (4),
whether the jury’s verdict indicated bias. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 382–84 (2010); see
also United States v. Tsarnaev, 157 F. Supp. 3d 57, 59 (D. Mass. 2016) (showing an application of the
Skilling factors).
362. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
363. See id. (“What other body would be likely to feel [confidence enough in its own situation], to
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The focus in this Part is on impartiality at a conceptual level, not at the
evidentiary level.364 We might subsequently have to decide what standards to
apply in deciding the admissibility of statements or other evidence of oathbreaking.365 But at least at this stage, we have assumed that all relevant
sources of evidence are valid to the extent that they evidence potential oathbreaking.366
Again, impartiality exists primarily as an ideal.367 Because senators will
often know the subject of impeachment, the risks of partiality are much
higher—especially when dealing with impeachments of presidents. If we
impose venire-like rules for the excusal of senators with prior knowledge of
the party or case, we would be left with an empty Senate chamber.368 But
even if difficult to achieve, the ideal of impartiality should guide reforms to
the impeachment process. Senators should aspire to set aside their partisan
and personal biases when they participate in impeachment trials.
B. Changing the Law
Now, consider the legal proposal: a perjury-like law criminalizing oathbreaking by senators.369 If the primary purpose of such a law is to deter
violations of the oath—in other words, to encourage senators to impartially
conduct themselves in impeachment trials—we might imagine it to have
several features. First, such a law must be enforceable, requiring some role
by the executive branch. Because the targets of the law would be legislators,
it would not make sense to leave the enforcement power in Congress. The

preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an [individual] accused, and
the [representatives of the people, his accusers]?”).
364. See id.; see also Neumann, supra note 14, at 316 (noting that senators are not bound to a
particular evidentiary burden of persuasion).
365. See supra text accompanying note 138.
366. See GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 117 (“[T]he House and the Senate ought to hear and consider
all evidence which seems relevant, without regard to technical rules.” (quoting CHARLES L. BLACK
JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 18 (1974))).
367. See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
528 (1833) (“The great objects to be attained in the selection of a tribunal for the trial of impeachments
are impartiality, integrity, intelligence, and independence.”).
368. See supra notes 268–72 and accompanying text.
369. This proposal would have to take the form of a statutory law. Common law crimes (including
perjury) cannot be prosecuted at the federal level. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812)
(holding that “all exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common law cases” must be “derived from
statute”).
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law would thus be more analogous to a criminal law than to an impeachment
rule.370 Alone, this feature should be uncontroversial. Most laws—whether
criminal or civil—are enforced by the Executive, whose constitutional duty is
to “take [c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully executed.”371
Second, such a law would ideally grant independent authority to the
enforcing body.372 Many, though not all, impeachments involve the
President.373 Though the primary subjects of the law would be senators, there
is a concern that a president facing an impeachment trial might use the law to
launch an ancillary attack on the impeachment process.374 As such, the law
would be ineffective unless insulated from the White House.375
An independent counsel is one possibility. Use of an independent
investigating body was upheld in Morrison v. Olson, in which the Court
addressed the constitutionality of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.376
The Ethics in Government Act allowed for the appointment of independent
counsel to prosecute statutorily defined parties.377 Most importantly, the
independent counsel could only be removed for “good cause,” thus insulating
her from political pressures.378 Unlike the Ethics in Government Act, which
conferred some discretion to the Attorney General as to whether to appoint an
independent counsel, we might envision that the law proposed here would be
triggered automatically anytime articles of impeachment were submitted to
the Senate.379 In such a case, a special court (as under the Ethics in
370. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2018) (describing perjury and its criminal penalties).
371. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see Kent et al., supra note 235, at 2113.
372. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 661–62 (1988) (providing a similar enforcing body,
the independent counsel, an independent base of authority for its prosecutions).
373. See Art.II.S4.1.1 Impeachment and Removal from Office: Overview, CONST. ANNOTATED,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artII-S4-1-1/ALDE_00000282/ (last visited Sept. 12,
2021) (“Congress has most notably employed the impeachment tool against the President and federal
judges, but all federal civil officers are subject to removal by impeachment.”).
374. See, e.g., William K. Kelley, The Constitutional Dilemma of Litigation Under the Independent
Counsel System, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (1999) (describing how President Clinton implied the
impeachment process was illegitimate by insinuating the independent counsel was “out to get him”).
375. See id. at 1214 (observing that Article III jurisdiction depends on whether Congress has
insulated a position “from direct presidential control”).
376. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660.
377. See id. at 661–62.
378. Id. at 663. The Act also allows for removal for “physical disability, mental incapacity, or any
other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel’s duties.” Id.
379. See Benjamin J. Priester, Paul G. Rozelle & Mirah A. Horowitz, The Independent Counsel
Statute: A Legal History, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 12–13 (1999) (discussing the Attorney
General’s discretionary coverage powers under current law).
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Government Act, such a court could consist of three judges of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, appointed by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court)380 could be called on to appoint an independent counsel
to monitor the impartiality of senators during the trial.381
An independent counsel would be well-equipped to enforce the senatorial
impeachment oath.382 William Treanor argues that “[t]he independent counsel
is uniquely likely to investigate and prosecute high-level wrongdoing
vigorously.”383 Both because of her mandate to specifically investigate
senators during the impeachment trial and because of her safeguarded
independence, an independent counsel would be especially qualified for the
task of enforcing the oath.384
Historically, the institution of the independent counsel has faced
criticisms.385 Some, such as William Kelley, worry that the independent
counsel “casts different components of the executive branch into the position
of litigating against one another.”386 But when appointed for impeachment
trials, the independent counsel functions as would any other check on one
branch of government by another.387 As long as the role of the independent
counsel is to ensure “impartial justice” in an impeachment trial, there should
be no litigation between the independent counsel and the President.388
Others, such as Michael Rappaport, have urged a shift away from
independent counsels to greater use of congressional investigations.389 Such
a recommendation would be inappropriate here for the same reason that

380. See 28 U.S.C. § 593 (2018); Priester et al., supra note 379, at 12 (describing the process by
which an independent counsel is appointed).
381. See 28 U.S.C. § 49 (2018) (describing the Ethics in Government Act’s process for creating a
special court).
382. See William Michael Treanor, Independent Counsel and Vigorous Investigation and
Prosecution, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 149 (1998) (stating that an independent counsel, because
not appointed by the President or Attorney General, will be able to “pursue potential criminality
fearlessly,” and thus enforce impartiality).
383. Id.
384. See id.
385. See Kelley, supra note 374, at 1199 (criticizing the use of independent counsels).
386. Id.
387. See, e.g., id. at 1221 (discussing checks and balances in context of the Comptroller General).
388. See, e.g., S. Res. 479, 99th Cong. (1986); see also Treanor, supra note 382, at 163 (“[T]he
[i]ndependent [c]ounsel’s institutional interest is simply with [their] own investigation, rather than
with the full run of prosecutions brought by the government.”).
389. See Michael B. Rappaport, Replacing Independent Counsels with Congressional
Investigations, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1595–96 (2000).
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Kelley argued the independent counsel was inappropriate for investigating
presidents. The practical difficulties of an intrabranch investigation—in this
case, the investigation of Congress by Congress—make Rappaport’s proposal
unlikely to solve the problem. Moreover, if, as Rappaport suggests, the aim
of congressional investigations would be to disclose information to the public,
such investigations would do little more than highlight the flagrant oathbreaking by senators in recent impeachment trials.390
Still others, including Akhil Amar, lament the inability of independent
counsels to actually function independently: “An ad hoc independent counsel
must build an organization from scratch, and those who volunteer may have
an ax to grind, since the target is known in advance.”391 The independence of
the independent counsel is indeed of paramount importance.392 Perhaps,
however, such a concern would be lessened if the subject of the independent
counsel’s oversight were an impeachment trial. As the examples highlighted
in Part II show, senators of both parties are prone to oath-breaking.393 Unlike
the investigation of a president, the target is not known in advance, and we
might hope that there would be fewer people volunteering to aid the
independent counsel for purely partisan reasons.394 Additionally, the threat of
judicial oversight (that judges might dispose of cases brought by a partisan or
partial independent counsel) reduces the risk that independent counsels will
succumb to partisan or personal loyalties.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the workability and desirability of
a perjury-like law will partially depend on the constitutionality of such a law.
After briefly proposing a constitutional basis for the law, I consider the two
most likely constitutional hurdles: the Speech and Debate Clause and the
Political Question Doctrine. While a perjury-like law would not clearly
violate the Speech and Debate Clause, such a law would likely be struck down
under the Court’s current approach to political questions.395
The Constitutional Basis of a Perjury-Like Law. Text, structure, and
history make clear that impeachment is a constitutionally protected process.
Even the impeachment oath is expressly provided for in Article I.396 The most
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

Id. at 1596.
Amar, supra note 99, at 296.
See Treanor, supra note 382.
See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
Cf. Amar, supra note 99, at 296.
See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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obvious constitutional basis for a perjury-like law, therefore, is the Necessary
and Proper Clause, which empowers Congress “[t]o make all [l]aws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into [e]xecution . . . all other
[p]owers vested by this Constitution in the [g]overnment of the United
States.”397 As John Mikhail forcefully argues, that Clause’s reference to those
powers vested in the “[g]overnment of the United States” empowers Congress
“to carry into execution all of the ‘supreme legislative, executive, and judicial
powers.’”398 It is immaterial, for our purposes, whether we classify
impeachment as a legislative or a judicial function; either way, Congress is
authorized to protect that constitutional process.399
Despite an apparently clear constitutional basis, there are several
objections that could be raised against such a law.
Objection 1: The Speech and Debate Clause. The Speech and Debate Clause
states:
[Congresspeople] shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony,
and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during
their Attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses,
and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other Place.400
It serves to protect the independence and integrity of the legislative branch by
protecting congresspeople from “executive or judicial intrusions into the
protected sphere of the legislative process.”401
A perjury-like impeachment law would not violate the Speech and Debate
Clause for three reasons. First, both the text of the Constitution and
surrounding records suggest that impeachment is different from regular
congressional activity.402 The Speech and Debate Clause applies only to

397. Id. at § 8, cl. 18.
398. John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1100 (2014) (emphasis
added) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 163, 168 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911)).
399. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
400. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
401. TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45043, UNDERSTANDING THE SPEECH AND DEBATE
CLAUSE 1 (2017).
402. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (describing Senate impeachment proceedings as a trial),
with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (describing protections for speech and debate during congressional
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congresspeople in “Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses,”403
and impeachment is not a “session” of the Senate. The Constitution uses
“session” to refer to Congress in its legislative function: in the Recess
Appointment Clause, “session” refers to the next opportunity of the Senate to
consider those presidential appointments made in the Senate’s absence;404 and
in the Twenty-fifth Amendment, Congress is “required to assemble,” in
“session,” to vote on whether the President is “unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office.”405 Impeachment, by contrast, is referred to as a trial:
“[T]he Senate shall have the sole [p]ower to try all Impeachments,” and the
President is “tried.”406 This distinction accords with Hamilton’s statement in
Federalist No. 65 that, for the purpose of impeachment, the Senate should take
on a “judicial character.”407 Owing to the judicial function of the Senate
during impeachment, statements made before and during an impeachment
trial are not clearly protected by the Speech and Debate Clause in the same
way as are statements made during the commission of the Senate’s legislative
functions.
Second, and relatedly, the Supreme Court has recognized clear limits to
the congressional behavior protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. In
United States v. Brewster, for example, the Court stated that those actions
which are “political in nature rather than legislative” are not protected,
including “news releases[] and speeches delivered outside the Congress.”408
A few years later, in United States v. Helstoski, the Court added that
“[p]romises by a [m]ember to perform an act in the future are not [protected]
legislative acts.”409 As both Brewster and Helstoski make clear, the behavior
a perjury-like law would target—public statements demonstrating partiality;
promises by senators (made outside the Senate chamber) to convict or acquit;
and more—falls outside that which is protected by the Speech and Debate
Clause. Such behavior is the type of “political . . . rather than legislative”

“sessions”).
403. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312 (1973) (noting that
“[c]ongressmen and their aides are immune from liability for their actions within the ‘legislative
sphere’” (citing Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624–25 (1972))).
404. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
405. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
406. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
407. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
408. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972).
409. United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 489 (1979).
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conduct that may validly be criminalized.410
There is a third, even more obvious, solution to the problem presented by
the Speech and Debate Clause. Even if we think senators’ statements about
an impeachment trial should be protected by that Clause, we can avoid that
constitutional barrier by making the violation of the senatorial impeachment
oath a felony. The Clause expressly excludes from its protection “[t]reason,
[f]elon[ies,] and [b]reach[es] of the [p]eace.”411 If oath-breaking is a felony
(and perhaps it should be, even for reasons beyond bolstering the law’s
constitutionality), the exception applies. Such an argument is complicated by
the fact that the meaning of “felonies” has changed since the Founding.412 As
Justice Thurgood Marshall observed in 1976, “[A] felony at common law and
a felony today bear only slight resemblance.”413 Common law felonies only
covered “the most serious crimes,” and perjury was not one.414 But Marshall
announced his position in a dissent, so if the Court’s majority continues to
adhere to a more expansive understanding of “felonies,” a perjury-like law
could survive as long as the law’s threatened punishment exceeds one year.415
Objection 2: The Political Question Doctrine. A separate, and more
serious, constitutional hurdle for a perjury-like law was set by the Supreme
Court in Nixon v. United States.416 In that case, the Court considered the
impeachment of Walter L. Nixon, a federal district court judge in
Mississippi.417 After being criminally convicted for making false statements
before a grand jury, Nixon was impeached by the House of Representatives
and convicted by the Senate.418 Nixon challenged the constitutionality of his
conviction, arguing that the Senate’s impeachment procedures—specifically,
the rule allowing for a committee of senators (rather than the entire Senate) to

410. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512 (clarifying the distinction between political and legislative behaviors
and that those legislative behaviors should be protected, while political should not).
411. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
412. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 438 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
413. Id.
414. Id. at 439–40 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22
MICH. L. REV. 541, 572–73 (1924) (describing perjury as a common law misdemeanor).
415. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 439 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recognizing the contemporary
definition of a felony as “[a]ny offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year”).
416. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
417. See id. at 226 (considering Nixon’s petition that the Court “decide whether Senate Rule
XI . . . [violates] the Impeachment Trial Clause, Art I, § 3, cl. 6”).
418. See id. at 227–29.
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receive evidence in the trial—violated the Constitution.419 But the Court did
not even reach the merits of Nixon’s challenge, holding instead that
impeachment raises a nonjusticiable “political question.”420 Most relevant for
this analysis is the Court’s conclusion that the constitutional impeachment
power was “textually committed” to the Senate.421 As a result of that
commitment, judicial review of the impeachment process is constitutionally
limited.422
The Court wondered what sort of relief the judiciary could even offer in
the impeachment context.423 That concern may reflect the judiciary’s
perennial anxiety about intervening in political processes.424 The Court’s
political and social capital is limited, and disruption of a high-profile
impeachment conviction would certainly diminish much, if not all, of that
capital.425 Additionally, even if the Court’s political and social capital was
not at risk, it is not clear what remedies would be available in the impeachment
setting. Even if the Court set aside a conviction and remanded the case back
to the Senate for a new trial, the outcome of the trial would (likely) be the
same.426 Unlike in the normal criminal context, in which a new and different

419. See id. at 228.
420. See id. at 226, 228 (“[B]efore we reach the merits of such a claim, we must decide whether it
is ‘justiciable,’ that is, whether it is a claim that may be resolved by the courts. We conclude that it is
not.”).
421. Id. at 228.
422. See id. at 228, 233.
423. See id. at 233.
424. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure
been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. To
demonstrate this requires no less than to analyze representative cases and to infer from them the
analytical threads that make up the political question doctrine.”).
425. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 129–70 (1980) (discussing
the limited political capital of the courts). Alexander Bickel’s prudential formulation of the political
question doctrine accounted for such practical concerns: “the anxiety, not so much that the judicial
judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but will not be” and “the inner vulnerability, the
self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.”
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 125–26, 184 (1962); see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN MANNING, DANIEL MELTZER &
DAVID SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 248–49 (Robert C. Clark et al.
eds, 7th ed. 2015) (describing Bickel’s prudential formulation of the political question doctrine).
426. See Geoff Drucker, Letters to the Editor, What Role Does the Supreme Court Have in
Impeachment?, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-role-
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jury can be empaneled after a case is remanded, the impeachment jury is
constitutionally fixed.427
The Court also worried that judicial review of impeachment rules and
procedures would disrupt the finality of the impeachment process428:
“[O]pening the door of judicial review to the procedures used by the Senate
in trying impeachments would ‘expose the political life of the country to
months, or perhaps years, of chaos.’”429
The application of Nixon to the perjury-like law proposed here is not
immediately obvious. On one hand, such a law would be an act of Congress
and would thus accord with the Nixon Court’s holding that impeachment was
to be regulated by Congress.430 Moreover, the finality of senatorial
impeachment judgments would not be threatened by such a law: a perjury-like
law would target oath-breaking senators, not the finality of the impeachment
judgment itself.431 We might imagine that only in extreme cases—for
example, if a critical mass of senators were convicted of violating their
oaths—would the finality of an impeachment trial actually be threatened.
But on the other hand, the creation of a parallel prosecutorial process,
which would be ongoing before and during impeachment proceedings, might
cast doubt on the outcomes of impeachment trials. To the extent that
impeachment is most potent when quickly managed—while political will and
public interest are highest—an independent counsel might unnecessarily
delay the process.432 Investigations and prosecutions can take months or
does-the-supreme-court-actually-have-in-regard-to-impeachment/2020/01/16/8a001454-3627-11eaa1ff-c48c1d59a4a1_story.html (emphasizing that the “jury pool” would remain the same if “the
Supreme Court could hypothetically reverse the decision of the Senate and remand with directions to
hold a new trial”). Thus, “returning the case to the Senate would risk making a mockery of the court
as the Senate might ignore the letter or spirit of [a hypothetical Supreme Court] decision.” Id.
427. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 6.
428. See Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff’d, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)
(cautioning that “[t]he need for finality in impeachments” is “acute”).
429. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 246
(D.C. Cir. 1991)).
430. Part of the Court’s holding that courts were not free to review impeachment procedures rested
on the understanding that impeachment was “textually committed” to Congress, specifically the
Senate. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228. Passage of legislation accords with that textual commitment. Id.
431. See Nixon, 838 F.2d at 245 (discussing the paramount importance of protecting Congress’s
impeachment responsibilities textually committed to it by the Constitution and the “need for finality”).
432. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Why the Mueller Investigation Failed, NEW YORKER (June 29, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/07/06/why-the-mueller-investigation-failed (detailing
how President Trump’s lawyers “knew that Mueller’s leverage, in political if not legal terms, would
only dwindle with time”).
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years, lasting well beyond the public memory of the alleged wrongdoing that
initiated the impeachment process.433 The existence of an independent
counsel would, at best, delegitimize the finality of impeachments by dragging
the proceedings out for years. At worst, if allowed to pause or delay
impeachment trials pending those separate investigations, such a law risks
exacerbating existing impeachment problems by creating new avenues
through which parties could disturb impeachment trials.434 Looked at
practically, a perjury-like law is prone to the very criticisms that made
impeachment nonjusticiable in Nixon.435
In sum, although a perjury-like law might be constitutionally defensible
as necessary to promoting the integrity of impeachment trials, and such a law
would not run afoul of the Speech and Debate Clause, it would not likely
survive scrutiny under the political question doctrine.
C. Changing Senate Rules
By contrast, changing the Senate’s rules is more likely permissible under
Nixon.436 Rule changes reflect the reasoned judgment of the legislative branch
and the Senate in particular—the body assigned the power to conduct
impeachment trials—about how those trials should be regulated.437 Any
amendments to the Senate’s rules would reflect the Senate’s judgment about
how to regulate the impeachment trial process, thus obviating the separationof-powers concerns raised by Justice Rehnquist in Nixon.438 Indeed, the Nixon
Court expressly endorsed the Senate’s rulemaking function in the
impeachment context.439
433. See, e.g., id.
434. For a discussion of other practical and legal barriers to what he calls “codifying constitutional
norms” (a more general version of the legal proposal considered here), see Jonathan S. Gould,
Codifying Constitutional Norms, 109 GEO. L.J. 703, 723–35 (2021).
435. See Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 245–46 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff’d, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
436. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (noting that Article I, § 3 conferred sole
power to the Senate to try impeachment proceedings).
437. See RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42929, PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING
CHANGES IN SENATE RULES 1 (2013) (noting that the “Constitution gives each house of Congress
plenary power over its own rules,” and thus confirming that rule changes are the avenue through which
the Senate can express its political will).
438. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228 (describing the nonjusticiability standard under the political
question doctrine, which stresses the importance of keeping the judiciary out of issues textually
committed to other branches of the government).
439. See id. at 226, 238.
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Senate rule changes might also resolve some of the temporal concerns
presented by the law described above. If senators violate their oaths, they can
be sanctioned relatively quickly.440 Sanctions including, but not limited to,
censure, removal from committee assignments, and reduction in staff
resources can disincentive oath-breaking without requiring the more stringent
procedural safeguards afforded to defendants that would prolong criminal
prosecutions.441
In general, the Senate’s ability to self-govern through rules is provided
for in Article I of the Constitution, which guarantees that “[e]ach House may
determine the [r]ules of its [p]roceedings.”442 It is through those rules (many
of which are so technical and esoteric as to rarely register on the radars of
even the most experienced Senate staffers) that the Senate conducts its dayto-day business. Current Senate rules govern everything from appointments
of chairs to voting procedures.443
The Senate’s impeachment rules are already quite robust.444 They were
amended as recently as 1986, although most of the rules still date back to the
nineteenth century and were adopted in anticipation of the impeachment trial
of President Andrew Johnson.445 Current rules regulate, among other things,
how the Senate receives and accepts articles of impeachment from House of
Representatives managers and how senators can ask questions of witnesses
during impeachment trials.446 Senate rules also govern the administration of
the senatorial impeachment oath—first to the “presiding officer” (usually the
440. See, e.g., About Censure, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/about/powersprocedures/censure.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2021) (noting that the Senate fully controls the sanctions
process through which it may discipline a senator by formally censuring him or her for conduct that is
“determined to be inappropriate or detrimental to the Senate”).
441. See United States Senate Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_item/election_book.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2021)
(noting that a Senate censure requires a simple majority vote to reprimand a member); see also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (providing that the Senate may “punish its Members for disorderly Behavior”).
442. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
443. See generally U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., RULES OF THE SENATE,
https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate (last visited Sept. 12, 2021).
444. See
About
Impeachment,
U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/about/powersprocedures/impeachment.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2021) (summarizing the impeachment trial
procedure).
445. See S. Res. 479, 99th Cong. (1986); RYBICKI & GREENE, supra note 199, at 2–4 (describing
the history of current impeachment trial rules); see also GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 33 (noting that
the Senate’s impeachment rules have “changed little since President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment
trial in 1866”).
446. RYBICKI & GREENE, supra note 199, at 4–6.
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Vice President or the President pro tempore), and then to the rest of the
senators.447
Those rules, however, are quiet about the public conduct of senators
before and during impeachment trials.448 It is that conduct that has proven
most problematic in recent decades, not only because the nature of
congressional communications has shifted with the growth of television-based
newscasting and the advent of social media but also because perceptions about
partisanship have become especially pronounced.449 When the Senate
considered amendments to its impeachment rules in 1974, a committee
appointed to make recommendations to the full body concluded that future
amendments “should be proposed only with the most valid justification.”450 It
is generally good that the Senate’s rules are rigid and unchanging.451 But as
the preceding analysis in this Article demonstrates, the standard has been met
and rule changes are warranted if those changes can successfully target the
pernicious partisanship denigrating recent impeachment trials.452
Compared to the difficulty of passing a law—which requires majority
votes in both houses of Congress and approval by the President—changing
Senate rules is relatively simple.453 Provided there is “one day’s notice in
writing,”454 rules can be changed with a simple majority vote.455 In United
States v. Ballin, the Supreme Court affirmed that only the “presence of a

447. See id. at 6–7.
448. See id. at 7 (noting that, while senators take an oath to do “impartial justice,” there are no other
requirements that might temper a senator’s behavior or speech related to an ongoing impeachment);
see also Amar, supra note 99, at 307 (noting that senators are free to consult their constituents and
often posture in the public forum).
449. See Domenico Montanaro, Tracing the Roots of a Partisan Impeachment, NPR (Dec. 19, 2019,
5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/19/789033023/tracing-the-roots-of-a-partisan-impeachment
(comparing the more bipartisan impeachment of President Clinton to the more polarizing
impeachment of President Trump).
450. RYBICKI & GREENE, supra note 199, at 4 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONGRESS, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING THE RULES AND PROCEDURE AND
PRACTICE IN THE SENATE WHEN SITTING ON IMPEACHMENT TRIALS 20 (1974)).
451. Cf. Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 646 (2014) (discussing
some of the benefits of bright-line rules: “uniformity, predictability, and low decision costs”).
452. See supra Section II.B.
453. See GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 152 (noting the ease with which the Senate may amend its
rules).
454. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., supra note 443 (Rule V).
455. See RYBICKI & GREENE, supra note 199, at 10. The filibuster complicates this calculation. If
a Senator filibusters a proposed rule change, a supermajority (two-thirds) of the Senate must vote to
end that filibuster before the proposed rule can be voted on. See BETH, supra note 437.
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majority” is constitutionally required for one House to “do [its] business.”456
Members of the first Senate in 1789 “approved 19 rules by a majority vote.”457
Though Senate norms have accommodated rules requiring greater-than-baremajority votes to end filibusters (three-fifths requirement)458 or to change the
rules limiting filibusters (two-thirds requirement),459 such higher vote
requirements are apparently matters of convention rather than rigid rules.460
Even if a filibuster necessitates a two-thirds vote, such a vote should be
attainable.461 The integrity of the impeachment process is a bipartisan
concern: presidents of both parties have faced impeachment trials in recent
decades, and senators from both parties have exhibited the partial, oathviolating behavior that rule changes would be designed to address. While
partisanship might be a problem during impeachment trials, it should not be
with regards to setting the rules for trials ex ante, behind the Rawlsian veil of
ignorance described above.462 In short, both parties can benefit from rule
changes.
To bolster the integrity of the impeachment process and ensure that
senators “do impartial justice,” the Senate’s rules could be reformed in at least
four ways. First, senators could be prohibited from ex parte interactions with
the impeached party (and his or her staff) and the House impeachment
managers concerning impeachment trials. Such a rule would prohibit the
“total coordination with the White House counsel” that Senator McConnell
promised before President Trump’s first impeachment trial.463 It would also
proscribe interactions outside the trial setting with House impeachment
managers. Such a rule would promote what Hamilton described as the
“necessary impartiality between an [individual] accused[] and the
456. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1892); see also Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The
Constitutional Option To Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means To Over Come
the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 209 (2004) (“[A simple] majority has exercised the
Senate’s constitutional rulemaking power to establish new precedents altering Senate procedure.”).
457. 125 CONG. REC. 144 (1979) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
458. See SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., supra note 443 (Rule XXII).
459. See id.
460. See James Wallner, A Beginner’s Guide to the Senate’s Rules, R ST. POL’Y STUDY 2 (Sept.
2017), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/107-1.pdf.
461. See Lisa Mascaro, EXPLAINER: What’s the Senate Filibuster and Why Change It?, AP NEWS
(Mar.
17,
2021),
https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-politics-filibustersf476940e279b6bc2a1bbfd7c5cc24f96 (observing that “[o]vercoming filibusters can take days, if not
weeks, but . . . doing so is possible”).
462. See supra text accompanying notes 342–43.
463. Benen, supra note 16.
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[representatives of the people, his accusers],” limiting the interactions
between senators and both groups.464 And it would not preclude senators from
discussing legislative matters—those unrelated to impeachment—with the
impeachment party (such as a president) or House impeachment managers in
their capacities as members of the House of Representatives.
A rule limiting senators’ abilities to communicate with parties and their
attorneys could mirror other rules designed to promote integrity in the Senate.
Current conflict-of-interest rules prohibit retired senators who have become
lobbyists from “lobby[ing] [m]embers, officers, or employees of the Senate
for a period of two years after leaving office.”465 Other rules likewise regulate
the abilities of senators to discuss confidential information—such as that
received by the President or the head of an executive department.466
Violations of confidentiality subject a senator to expulsion.467 A rule limiting
the ability of senators to engage with the parties to impeachment trials before
and during such trials can be modeled on those other rules.468
Second, new procedures could expressly allow for the for-cause removal
of senators violating the impartiality requirement.469 Senators who make
statements about their future votes before impeachment trials even begin—
such as those by Senator Graham470 and Senator Hirono471—are obvious
contenders for removal. Senators do not have an inalienable right to
participate in impeachment trials, nor do impeached parties have a right to
trials by all senators; the Constitution commands only that “no Person shall
be convicted without the Concurrence of two[-]thirds of the Members
present.”472 If a senator, like a juror, were excused, she would not be counted
464. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
465. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., supra note 443 (Rule XXXVII).
466. See id. (Rule XXIX).
467. See id.
468. See supra notes 448–50 and accompanying text.
469. During the impeachment of President Trump, Lawrence Lessig proposed the removal of partial
Senators. See Lawrence Lessig, Don’t Allow McConnell To Swear a False Oath, WASH. POST (Jan.
8,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dont-allow-mcconnell-to-swear-a-falseoath/2020/01/08/78bb70ae-3234-11ea-a053-dc6d944ba776_story.html; see also Jonathan Granoff,
Senator-Jurors Who May Not Be Impartial? Remove Them for Cause, HILL (Jan. 21, 2020, 9:30 AM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/479095-senator-jurors-who-may-not-be-impartial-removethem-for-cause (endorsing Lessig’s removal proposal).
470. Itkowitz, supra note 133.
471. Mazie Hirono (@MazieHirono), TWITTER (Dec. 19, 2019, 12:17 PM),
https://twitter.com/maziehirono/status/1207711526666358784.
472. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
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as “present,” reducing the total number of votes necessary to convict the
impeached party.473 Just as jurors are removed for cause when they are clearly
partial, senators should be removed if they make it clear that they will not be
able to “do impartial justice” because of their biases or partisan loyalties.474
Third, either as an alternative or as an additional measure, the Senate can
enable censure of oath-breaking senators.475 Though censure does not remove
a senator from office, it “can have a powerful psychological effect on a
member and his [or] her relationships in the Senate.”476 As a result,
throughout the history of the United States, only nine senators have been
censured.477 Expressly providing for the censure of oath-breaking senators
would, one hopes, emphasize the gravity of senators’ roles in impeachment
trials and, separately, might provide a powerful deterrent to the most flagrant
oath-breaking behavior.478
Finally, Senate impeachment trial votes could be conducted using a secret
ballot.479 There are obvious trade-offs to such a rule change, including the
473. See S. REP. No. 93–33, at 81 (1986) (noting that a vote of “two-thirds of the [m]embers present”
is required to sustain an impeachment conviction).
474. See Lessig, supra note 469 (suggesting that the Chief Justice should forbid senators who make
openly partisan comments from participating in an impeachment proceeding).
475. Censure is also available against impeached parties, such as the President. See, e.g., Michael
J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of Censure, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 33, 33–34 (1999) (defending the
constitutionality of censuring presidents). Michael Gerhardt argues that “every conceivable source of
constitutional authority—text, structure, original understanding, and historical practices—supports the
legitimacy of the House’s and/or the Senate’s passage of a resolution expressing disapproval of the
President’s conduct.” Id. at 34. During the impeachment trial of President Trump, Senator Joe
Manchin proposed censuring the President. See The Hill Staff, READ: Manchin's Proposed Senate
Censure of Trump, HILL (Feb. 3, 2020, 5:26 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/481268-readmanchins-proposed-senate-censure-of-trump. For an argument for the unconstitutionality of censure
against presidents, see Jack Chaney, The Constitutionality of Censuring the President, 61 OHIO ST.
L.J. 979, 979 (2000) (“[T]he use of censure as an alternative [to impeachment] is both dangerous and
contrary to fundamental Constitutional principles.”).
476. Censure, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_index_subjects/Censure
_vrd.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2021).
477. See id.; see also Laura Krugman Ray, Discipline Through Delegation: Solving the Problem of
Congressional Housecleaning, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 414 (1994) (noting that censure “has thus
become a little used instrument for correction of legislative misconduct”).
478. See JACK MASKELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL75700, EXPULSION AND CENSURE ACTIONS
TAKEN BY THE FULL SENATE AGAINST MEMBERS 26 (2008) (“Although there is no specific disability
that automatically follows a censure by the Senate, the public reprobation and formal rebuke by one’s
peers in the Senate may have arguably contributed to the unsuccessful reelection efforts of Senators
subject to censure in recent times.”).
479. Douglas Kmiec defended this proposal around the times of both of President Trump’s
impeachment trials. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Donald Trump Should Be Convicted Unanimously by
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reduction in the transparency of the process and the resulting loss of
legitimacy.480 But, especially where the person subject to impeachment
commands substantial social or political capital, a secret ballot may better
enable senators to vote according to their consciences—hopefully
impartially—without fear of reprisal.481 A secret vote (on a separate question)
was held in the House of Representatives just days before the most recent
impeachment trial, so such a mechanism is not entirely novel.482
Each of these proposed Senate rules would promote the integrity of the
impeachment process by promoting the enforceability of the senatorial
impeachment oath.483 But rule changes are not a perfect solution. Senate rules
are not enforceable through the courts, as would be a perjury-like law.484 The
judiciary promises independence that cannot be achieved through selfpolicing.485 And just as the Senate can quickly change its rules to cure
impeachment process defects, those rules can be reverted back to their

Secret Ballot, HILL (Feb. 8, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/537318-donaldtrump-should-be-convicted-unanimously-by-secret-ballot; Douglas W. Kmiec, Trump’s Impeachment
Trial Could Use a Secret Ballot, HILL (Jan. 29, 2020, 9:15 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/whitehouse/480294-trumps-impeachment-trial-requires-a-secret-ballot. Robert Reich defended the same
general idea on Twitter. See Robert Reich (@RBReich), TWITTER (Jan. 25, 2021, 6:12 PM),
https://twitter.com/RBReich/status/1353888482070913029.
480. Cf. Allison R. Hayward, Bentham & Ballots: Tradeoffs Between Secrecy and Accountability
in How We Vote, 26 J.L. & POL. 39, 39–45 (2010) (arguing that open voting by legislators is superior
to secret voting because constituencies can observe those legislators’ choices and hold them
accountable).
481. Cf. Charles B. Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Constitutional Protection Against Governmental
Intrusions in Political Affairs, 47 MICH. L. REV. 181, 193–94 (1948) (observing that a voting-secrecy
requirement may prevent reprisals against recalcitrant voters and, thus, may serve a social interest).
482. See Catie Edmonson & Nicholas Fandos, House Republicans Choose to Keep Liz Cheney in
Leadership Post After Her Vote To Impeach Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/03/us/liz-cheney-vote.html.
483. See Benen, supra note 16; Granoff, supra note 469; Gerhardt, supra note 475; Kmiec, supra
note 479.
484. Michael Gerhardt raises this concern after Nixon, wondering whether it would even be possible
for the Senate to manufacture judicial enforceability through Senate rules. See Michael J. Gerhardt,
Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of Impeachments After Nixon, 44 DUKE L.J. 231,
267 (1994). As he observes, “[t]he settlement of this issue depends on whether the Senate has the
power to waive its constitutional immunity from judicial review”—an unanswered question after
Nixon. Id.
485. See Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional
Analysis, 142 U PA. L. REV. 209, 212 n.9 (1993) (explaining that “even if judicial self-regulation is a
permissible source of discipline, cumbersome procedures could drain judicial resources and outweigh
any intended benefit, or substantive standards could encroach on the desired independence of the
judiciary”).
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defective forms if the controlling party hopes to manipulate an impending
impeachment trial.486 As a result, allowing the Senate to self-police or
requiring the Chief Justice to make decisions about enforcement during
impeachments of presidents may not clearly change the status quo.487 During
the impeachment trial of President Trump, for example, Senator McConnell
rebuffed calls to recuse himself.488 It is not clear that a more formal removal
proceeding, even one initiated by Chief Justice Roberts, would have yielded
a different outcome.489
These proposals will also not address other deficiencies in the Senate’s
impeachment rules.490 There are, for example, currently no clear rules of
evidence or standards of proof for impeachment trials.491 Some worry that
senators “lack the requisite experience, expertise, or training to deal
competently with impeachment matters”492—a clear rebuke of Hamilton’s
vision. But despite such apparent weaknesses, rule changes have the
advantage of straightforward constitutionality, even after Nixon, and they are
surely better than nothing.493 Rule changes afford to senators the opportunities
486. See, e.g., Turley, supra note 14, at 113 (explaining that “where factionalism has reigned in
impeachment trials, such as the trial of President Clinton, it is notable that Senate trial rules were
significantly altered to reduce open deliberation and debate”).
487. See generally GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 266–69 (discussing Senate self-policing and rules
enforcement).
488. See Zachary Evans, Democratic Representative Calls on McConnell To Recuse Himself and
Threatens
Mistrial,
NAT’L
REV.
(Dec.
18,
2019,
8:51
AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/news/dem-rep-calls-on-mcconnell-to-recuse-himself-threatensmistrial/. The chief advantage of a perjury-like law would be shifting enforcement and oversight to
an independent authority.
489. See Frank Bowman, The Role of the Chief Justice in an Impeachment Trial, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 10, 2020, 11:18 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/01/the-role-of-the-chief-justice-in-animpeachment-trial/ (explaining that, despite hopes that Chief Justice Roberts could transform Senate
proceedings during the impeachment of former President Donald Trump “into a trial of the
conventional judicial sort,” such a transformation was highly unlikely).
490. These rule proposals would not target other areas of the impeachment process where greater
clarity is needed. GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 114 (“The four most significant procedural issues
raised in impeachment proceedings have been (1) whether a Senate impeachment trial is more like a
criminal or civil proceeding for purposes of determining the appropriate burden of proof; (2) whether
any special privileges apply to impeachment proceedings; (3) what rules of evidence, if any, should
be applied in impeachment trials . . . ; and (4) the propriety of the Senate’s using a special trial
committee to take testimony and receive evidence.”).
491. See, e.g., id. at 42–44; Hilary Hurd & Benjamin Wittes, Imagining a Senate Trial: Reading the
Senate Rules of Impeachment Litigation, LAWFARE (Dec. 2, 2019, 3:35 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/imagining-senate-trial-reading-senate-rules-impeachment-litigation.
492. GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 36.
493. See Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 243–44 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff’d, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)
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and incentives to exhibit the independence, integrity, and dignity that the
Founders envisioned.494 The proposals above, and perhaps others, will enable
future changes by promoting the “impartial justice” upon which impeachment
trials must be premised.
The ambition of the above-described proposals—both the proposed law
and the proposed Senate rules changes—is to deter oath-breaking by senators
and thus to restore to the Senate the dignity and independence envisioned by
the Founders. Just the prospect of being prosecuted or penalized would, one
hopes, lead senators to “do impartial justice,” as the oath demands.495 The
proposals, if enacted, would also help to insulate the impeachment process
from outside pressures. Gerhardt concludes that the “principal challenge” for
future impeachments will be overcoming the public, political pressures
surrounding impeachment.496 These proposals make it easier for senators to
publicly justify their impeachment behavior, and they incentivize senators to
conform their behavior to the gravity of impeachment.
The two proposals also address a separate concern that is often raised in
the impeachment context: the preservation of due process for impeached
parties.497 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause promises that no one
shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”498
(“The rules clause provides at least indirect support for the view that the Senate’s ‘sole [p]ower to try
all [i]mpeachments’ includes the sole power to frame the rules it will follow in conducting such
trials.”).
494. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Where else than in the Senate could have
been found a tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other body would be
likely to feel [confidence enough in its own situation], to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the
necessary impartiality between an [individual] accused, and the [representatives of the people, his
accusers]?”).
495. See S. Res. 479, 99th Cong. (1986); see also MASKELL, supra note 478.
496. See GERHARDT, supra note 32, at xiii (“[T]he principal challenge going forward with the
impeachment process is that members of Congress are likely to feel tremendous pressure to forgo
investigating a president with high approval ratings or substantial popularity. Likewise, members of
Congress are likely to feel significant public resistance to forgo legislative business of concern to their
constituents to address low-profile impeachable officials’ misconduct. The future of the federal
impeachment process depends on the resolve of members of Congress to treat their impeachment
authority as one of their most important duties and to undertake some political risk for the sake of
checking the most serious kinds of abuses by high-ranking executive and judicial officers who may
not be meaningfully accountable through any other means.”).
497. See, e.g., Gene Healy, Opinion: Trump’s ‘Due Process’ Dodge on Impeachment, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 25, 2019, 2:44 PM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-10-25/impeachment-donaldtrump-due-process-inquiry (quoting President Trump’s now-deleted tweet complaining that, “They
can impeach the President without due process or fairness or any legal rights”).
498. U.S. CONST. amend V.
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The text of the Clause does not except impeachment trials from coverage,499
and even if it did, the normative promise of due process—that all citizens
should be procedurally safeguarded against arbitrary or capricious exercises
of power—justifies its application. The promotion of impartiality is a modest
step towards due process ideals. Even if not sufficient, the provision of a
“neutral decision-maker” is necessary to the satisfaction of procedural due
process.500
But it is possible that such proposals would have unintended
consequences. Perhaps, for example, senators would become more discreet
about their oath-breaking, refusing to speak publicly about impeachment trials
to avoid prosecution or penalization. There are two possible responses to such
a concern. First, silence by senators during impeachment might be a good
thing, even if those senators are still quietly violating their oaths.501 Even the
appearance of impartiality would be a laudable objective if that appearance
restores some legitimacy to the impeachment process. Second, and more
significantly, if senators are being quiet about their partialities, one hopes that
they will be able to more meaningfully discuss the substantive merits of the
impeachment.502 In this way, the law might indirectly foster more serious and
solemn debate during impeachment trials by keeping the partisan
considerations out of the conversation.
Another concern with the above proposals is that they may infringe on the
protected rights of senators, as jurors, to vote according to their consciences.
If senators believe an impeached party is guilty of the alleged misconduct but
should not be removed from office, perhaps those senators should be allowed
to nullify.503 As a legal matter, jury nullification is derived from the jury’s
independence; the jury is revered and promoted as an institution independent
of judges or legislatures.504 Akhil Amar suggests that senators, like jurors, are

499. See GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 40 (noting that the Due Process Clause “makes no exceptions
to its application to congressional actions; therefore the text appears to apply in all contexts, including
impeachment”).
500. See id.
501. See generally Cohen, supra note 42.
502. See Amar, supra note 99, at 314–15.
503. See Cohen, supra note 42 (considering whether senators might nullify their impeachment
votes).
504. See, e.g., Duane, supra note 255, at 6–7. Duane argues that this independence is a product of
both the Sixth Amendment’s “inviolable right to a jury determination” and the Fifth Amendment’s
Double Jeopardy Clause, which guarantees that “[e]ven where the jury’s verdict of not guilty seems
indefensible, that clause prevents the [s]tate from pursuing even the limited remedy of a new trial.”
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free to nullify: “Like any ordinary criminal juror, each [s]enator is free to be
merciful for a wide variety of reasons—because she thinks the defendant has
suffered enough, or because the punishment does not fit the crime, or because
punishing the defendant would impose unacceptable costs on innocent third
parties.”505
But such a concern risks overstating the relationship between senatorial
jurors and normal trial jurors.506 Amar provides no basis—historical or
otherwise—for such a relationship, and the senatorial jury is not derived from
the same constitutional principles as the normal trial jury. In contrast to
normal jury nullification, which is permissible (even if not encouraged), there
is seemingly no basis for senatorial nullification.507 There is no impeachment
equivalent of the Double Jeopardy Clause and, as a result, no de facto
senatorial independence to parallel the jury’s traditional independence. The
Senate’s independence, described by Hamilton in Federalist No. 65, was
intended to promote impartiality, not empower its avoidance.508 In fact, the
Senate was chosen to handle impeachments rather than a jury because the
Senate was the institution most capable of “uninfluenced” judgment and
“impartiality.”509 Nullification, or the exercise of senatorial “conscience,”
makes little sense as part of that constitutional scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
The constitutional impeachment process is broken. As envisioned, the
Senate was expected to be the body “sufficiently dignified” and “sufficiently
independent” to consider those serious charges brought against officers of the
United States.510 Since the early years of the republic, the Senate has imparted
Id.; see also CONRAD, supra note 256, at 7 (“The doctrine [of jury independence] states that jurors in
criminal trials have the right to refuse to convict if they believe that a conviction would be in some
way unjust.”).
505. Amar, supra note 99, at 307.
506. See David Welna, Are the Senators in the Impeachment Trial ‘Jurors’—or Something Else?,
NPR (Jan. 22, 2020, 4:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/22/798644714/are-the-senators-in-theimpeachment-trial-jurors-or-something-else (discussing the differences between senators in an
impeachment trial and trial jurors).
507. See generally J. Richard Broughton, Conviction, Nullification, and the Limits of Impeachment
as Politics, 68 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 275, 295 (2017) (discussing the legitimacy of senatorial
nullification).
508. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
509. See id.
510. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
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the importance of independence and dignity through the oath, taken at the
beginning of every impeachment trial, to “do impartial justice.”511 Behavior
by senators in recent impeachment trials demonstrates a willingness to break
that oath.
This Article considers several avenues for reform. Drawing on literature
and case law addressing other common oaths—juror oaths, oaths for public
office, and witness oaths—I considered the constitutionality of a perjury-like
law that would allow for the prosecution of oath-breaking senators. Though
such a law would have the advantage of making the oath to “do impartial
justice” judicially enforceable, it would not clearly survive constitutional
scrutiny under the existing political question doctrine. I next recommend
several possible Senate rules: prohibiting senators from discussing
impeachment trials with the prosecution (the House managers) or the defense
(the party subject to impeachment or her staff) outside of the trial setting;
allowing for the for-cause removal of senators with obvious partial or partisan
motives; expressly providing for the censure of senators who violate their
oaths; and using a secret ballot for impeachment votes. While not judicially
enforceable, such rules might be enough to restore the impeachment process
to its constitutional pedestal.

511. Id.; see discussion supra Section II.C.
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